Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State by Liston, Mary
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2008
Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the
Administrative State
Mary Liston
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, liston@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons.
Citation Details
Mary Liston, "Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State" in Colleen Flood & Lorne Sossin eds,
Administrative Law In Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publishing, 2008) 77.
77
Chapter Four
Governments in Miniature: 
the rule of Law in the 
administrative State
Mary LiSton*
Centre for Ethics, University of Toronto
	 I.	 Introduction	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 78
	 II.	 The	Rule	of	Law	in	Theory	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 78
A.	 The	Purpose	of	the	Rule	of	Law:	The	Non-Arbitrary		
Rule	of	Men	(and	Women)		. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 79
B.	 Attributes	of	the	Rule	of	Law		. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 80
		 III.	 The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	on	the	Rule	of	Law’s	Significance		 . . . . . . . . 	 87
A.	 The	Heart	of	the	Canadian	Rule	of	Law	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 87
B.	 A	Foundational	Principle,	but	an	“Unwritten”	One	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 90
C.	 The	New	Minimalist	Rule	of	Law	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 93
D.	 Lower	Court	Unruliness?		 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 98
	 IV.	 Administering	the	Rule	of	Law	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 99
A.	 A	Complex	Institutional	Relationship	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 99
B.	 The	Rule	of	Law	and	Post-Charter	Administrative	Law:		
Deference	as	Respect		 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 100
C.	 An	Example	of	Deference	as	Respect:	National	Corn	Growers		. . . . . . . . 	 101
D.	 Two	Problems	for	Deference	as	Respect:		
Privative	Clauses	and	the	Choice	of	the	Standard	of	Review	. . . . . . . . . . 	 104
E.	 Constraining	the	Charter		. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 108
F.	 Institutional	Dialogue	and	the	Canadian	Rule	of	Law	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 109
G.	 Other	Routes	to	Accountability	in	the	Administrative	State	 . . . . . . . . . . . 	 112
	 V.	 Conclusion:	A	Democratic	Rule	of	Law	in	the	Administrative	State?		. . . . . . 	 113
Suggested	Additional	Readings		 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 114
*	 Postdoctoral	Fellow	in	Ethics	and	Law,	Centre	for	Ethics,	University	of	Toronto.	I	would	like	to	thank	David	
Duff,	Colleen	Flood,	Evan	Fox-Decent,	Zvi	Halpern,	and	Audrey	Macklin	for	their	careful	analysis	of	the	
arguments	and	thoughtful	suggestions	for	improvement.
78	 Chapter	4	 Governments	in	Miniature
I.  IntroductIon
If	there	is	one	concept	that	ties	together	the	seemingly	disparate	strands	of	administrative	
law,	it	is	surely	the	rule	of	law.	This	chapter	discusses	several	attributes	of	the	rule	of	law	
and	explores	their	relevance	for	Canadian	administrative	law.	Although	it	is	unlikely	that	
the	rule	of	law	will	constitute	a	direct	and	complete	basis	for	answering	a	law	exam	ques-
tion,	the	puzzles	and	tensions	that	administrative	law	evokes	cannot	be	understood	without	
recourse	to	this	foundational	concept.
Part	II	presents	several	of	the	main	features	of	the	rule	of	law:	the	rule	of	law	as	a	constitu-
tional	principle,	the	rule	of	law	as	a	political	ideal	involving	a	matrix	of	institutional	rela-
tions	and	competencies,	and	the	rule	of	law	as	a	distinctive	political	morality.1	Part	III	of	
this	chapter	assesses	the	Canadian	articulation	of	the	rule	of	law	in	the	jurisprudence	of	the	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada.	The	fourth	part	focuses	on	judicial	review	of	administrative	ac-
tion	as	a	key	component	of	the	rule	of	law.	The	conclusion	argues	that	at	least	for	Canadian	
administrative	law,	the	rule	of	law	is	best	conceived	as	an	open	set	of	institutional	practices	
entailing	shared	responsibility	for	upholding	the	content	of	the	rule	of	law,	a	responsibility	
that	is	distributed	within	and	among	coordinate	institutions.
II.  the rule of law In theory
Certain	philosophical	 concepts—for	 example,	 democracy,	 freedom,	 autonomy,	 equality,	
rights,	and	the	rule	of	law—do	not	have	a	firmly	agreed-upon	core	of	meaning	and	there-
fore	can	be	considered	essentially	contested.2	Despite	this	uncertain	state	of	philosophical	
affairs,	this	part	suggests	that	the	rule	of	law	can	be	characterized	by	three	interrelated	fea-
tures:	a	jurisprudential	principle	of	legality;	an	activity	or	practice	of	law-making	among	and	
within	an	institutional	arrangement	of	government;	and	a	distinctive	political	morality.	To-
gether,	these	three	features	affirm	the	rule	of	law	as	an	overarching	normative	relationship	
among	 legal	 subjects	 and	 the	 state,	 seeking	 to	 prevent	 the	 arbitrary	 use	 of	 power,	 and	
	encouraging	appropriate	forms	of	responsiveness	among	government	institutions	and	be-
tween	these	institutions	and	affected	individuals.	While	this	presentation	may	initially	seem	
1	 By	political	morality,	I	mean	principles	of	justice	that	are	publicly	endorsed;	constitute	the	political	relation-
ship	between	the	state,	groups,	and	individuals;	and	inform	political	and	legal	practices.	These	principles	
justify	the	use	of	coercive	state	power,	power	that	the	state	claims	universal	authority	to	exercise	over	mem-
bers	of	a	political	community.	Principles	of	justice	ought	to	be	enforced	by	the	state	in	society	as	well	as	
within	state	institutions.	Political	morality,	because	it	is	public,	is	distinguishable	from	various	private	mo-
ralities	that	establish	relations,	rights,	and	duties	among	individuals.	The	legal	and	political	dimensions	of	a	
political	morality	come	together	in	judicial	review	in,	for	example,	how	judges	understand	their	role	in	up-
holding	fidelity	to	the	concept	of	the	rule	of	law	in	a	constitutional	order.	Different	political	moralities,	for	
example,	provide	different	justifications	for	the	supervisory	role	of	courts	and	the	scope	of	judicial	power.
2	 For	an	elucidation	of	the	nature	of	“essentially	contested	concepts”	with	reference	to	the	rule	of	law,	see	Jeremy	
Waldron,	“Is	the	Rule	of	Law	an	Essentially	Contested	Concept	(in	Florida)?”	(2002)	21	Law	&	Phil.	137.	
Waldron	discusses	how	disagreements	about	underlying	normative	issues—issues	such	as	what	values	the	
rule	of	law	is	meant	to	promote	or	what	is	the	best	understanding	of	the	rule	of	law—are	pervasive	and	pre-
dictable.	Despite	such	ever-present	disagreements,	rival	conceptions	may	in	fact	agree	on	many	of	the	par-
ticular	attributes	or	features	that	make	up	a	complex	concept.	They	may,	however,	disagree	about	the	most	
important	features,	or	what	features	are	necessary	but	not	sufficient,	or	about	how	the	features	work	together	
in	a	successful	application	of	the	concept.
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uncontroversial,	deeply	embedded	within	any	discussion	of	the	rule	of	law	is	a	debate	about	
the	legitimate	scope	and	content	of	judicial	power,	particularly	in	a	democratic	state.
a.   the Purpose of the rule of law:  
the non-arbitrary rule of Men (and women)
Since	Plato	and	Aristotle,	the	rule	of	law	has	been	contrasted	with	the	rule	of	men.	Funda-
mentally,	the	rule	of	law	means	that	government	action	must	always	be	sourced	in	law	and	
therefore	bound	by	law	in	order	to	be	considered	both	valid	and	legitimate.	In	practice,	the	
rule	of	law	requires	that	legal	and	political	institutions	and	their	associated	practices	control	
both	overt	and	latent	forms	of	arbitrariness	within	the	exercise	of	public	authority	in	modern	
states.	The	concept	of	arbitrariness	itself	admits	many	meanings,	though	law	students	will	
recognize	several	of	these	meanings	as	the	concrete	subject	matter	of	administrative	law.
Arbitrariness	connotes	an	indifference	about	the	procedures	chosen	to	reach	an	outcome.	
One	could,	for	example,	either	toss	a	coin	or	play	a	game	of	rock-paper-scissors	to	make	a	
choice;	the	means	do	not	necessarily	matter	for	the	quality	of	the	outcome.	More	problem-
atically,	arbitrariness	can	also	suggest	that	a	decision-maker	possesses	unconstrained	dis-
cretionary	powers,	 such	 that	he	or	she	alone	can	decide	on	how	 to	use	 these	expansive	
powers;	hence,	arbitrariness	can	be	associated	with	a	unilateral	mode	of	decision-making	
or	one	that	is	not	fully	reciprocal,	consultative,	or	participatory.	Most	familiarly,	arbitrari-
ness	is	expressed	in	the	idea	of	an	untrammelled	exercise	of	will,	or	the	uncontrolled	power,	
of	an	authority.	A	decision,	for	example,	may	exhibit	unilateralness	 to	a	degree	that	be-
comes	oppressive	and	will	therefore	be	considered	arbitrary	or	illegitimate;	in	other	words,	
an	abuse	of	power.	This	understanding	informs	familiar	criticisms	of	majority	decision-
making	that	infringes	minority	rights.	Finally,	arbitrariness	seems	to	suggest	the	opposite	
of	a	rule,	although	a	rule	can	be	applied	arbitrarily	by	judges	or	administrators.
All	branches	of	government—executive,	legislative,	judicial,	administrative—can	mani-
fest	arbitrary	behaviour	in	relation	to	individuals,	groups,	or	other	parts	of	government.	If	
a	branch	of	government	steps	outside	its	allotted	constitutional	role	or	function,	the	action	
or	decision	will	be	considered	arbitrary	in	the	sense	that	it	is	ultra	vires	(that	is,	beyond	the	
powers	of)	its	jurisdictional	limits.	Division	of	powers	cases	in	Canadian	federalism	pro-
vide	examples	of	this	kind	of	legal	wrong.	If	a	branch	of	government	attempts	to	monopo-
lize	governmental	power,	or	encroaches	on	the	powers	of	another	branch,	this	action	will	
offend	the	doctrine	of	the	separation	of	powers,	a	principle	that	authorizes	a	particular	dis-
tribution	of	political	power	within	a	state.	The	action	or	decision	will	be	considered	not	to	
be	sourced	in	law	and	will	be	found	invalid	or	void	for	that	reason.	If	a	decision-maker	in	gov-
ernment	uses	statutory	discretion	outside	the	purpose	of	the	enabling	statute,	the	resultant	
decision	will	be	found	arbitrary	in	the	sense	of	being	incorrect	in	law.	In	all	of	these	exam-
ples,	government	action	will	be	found	invalid	because	it	offends	procedural	justice	(other-
wise	known	as	natural	justice	or	fairness)	or	because	it	violates	the	formally	authorized	al-
location	of	institutional	roles	and	responsibilities	in	a	constitution.
In	contrast	to	the	quality	or	appropriateness	of	the	means	used	by	a	public	authority,	the	
decision	itself	may	be	arbitrary	in	substance	because	it	is	biased,	illogical,	unreasonable,	or	
capricious.	In	other	words,	it	will	offend	what	appear	to	be	shared	standards	of	reasonable-
ness,	rationality,	or	morality.	Such	a	decision	may	exhibit	a	lack	of	care,	concern,	or	reflection	
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on	the	part	of	the	decision-maker	toward	the	affected	individual	or	group.	It	can,	instead	of	
a	justified	response,	show	mere	opinion,	preference,	stereotyping,	or	negative	discrimina-
tion.	Arbitrariness	in	the	activity	of	decision-making	therefore	includes	both	procedural	and	
substantive	elements	and	necessarily	involves	a	normative	view	of	the	affected	person(s).	
The	normativity	of	a	legal	subject	fundamentally	concerns	the	person	as	a	bearer	of	rights	
and	responsibilities	as	well	as	an	individual	who	enjoys	autonomy,	dignity,	and	equality.	
In	other	words,	the	affected	person	is	treated	as	if	he	or	she	has	worth	as	an	individual,	a	
citizen,	and	a	member	of	his	or	her	political	community.3
The	ever-present	political	and	legal	problem	of	the	arbitrary	use	of	public	power	profound-
ly	animates	 rule	of	 law	concerns.	Before	 turning	 to	administrative	 law,	however,	 this	part	
	considers	legal	and	political	theory	in	order	to	identify	several	features	of	the	rule	of	law.
B.  attributes of the rule of law
The	rule	of	law	has	a	kind	of	“dual	residency”	in	legal	and	political	theory.	In	law,	it	acts	as	a	
constitutional	metaprinciple	that	organizes	and	connects	a	subsidiary	and	open	set	of	asso-
ciated	principles.4	For	example,	the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	informs	the	principle	of	le-
gality,	the	principle	of	the	separation	of	powers,	the	principle	of	judicial	independence,	the	
principle	of	access	to	justice,	the	principles	of	fundamental	justice,	the	proper	administra-
tion	of	justice,	and	so	on.5	If	the	rule	of	law	has	a	core	of	meaning	in	legal	theory,	it	is	the	
principle	of	 legality.	The	import	of	 the	principle	of	 legality	for	 the	rule	of	 law	is	 that	 it	
	conveys	the	basic	intuition	that	law	should	always	authorize	the	use	of	public	power	and	
constrain	the	risk	of	the	arbitrary	use	of	public	power.	The	principle	of	legality	restrains	ar-
bitrary	power	in	three	ways:	first,	it	constrains	the	actions	of	public	officials;	second,	it	reg-
ulates	the	activity	of	law-making;	and	third,	it	seeks	to	minimize	harms	that	may	be	created	
by	law	itself.	The	views	of	three	prominent	legal	theorists—Albert	V.	Dicey,	Lon	Fuller,	
and	Joseph	Raz—illustrate	how	the	principle	of	 legality	constrains	the	misuse	of	public	
power	in	each	of	these	ways.
The	first	model	was	most	famously	articulated	by	Albert	V.	Dicey	in	his	theory	of	British	
constitutionalism.	In	Dicey’s	view,	the	rule	of	law	possessed	three	features:
•	 the	 absence	 of	 arbitrary	 authority	 in	 government,	 but	 especially	 in	 the	 executive	
branch	and	the	administrative	state;
3	 The	benefits	of	the	rule	of	law	can	extend	to	non-citizens	who	are	present	in	Canadian	territory.	Evan	Fox-
	Decent,	in	chapter	7,	discusses	how	cases	involving	non-citizens	in	the	immigration	context	have	posed	chal-
lenges	for,	and	often	been	the	source	of	extensions	to	the	scope	of,	procedural	fairness	in	administrative	law.
4	 See	Friedrich	A.	von	Hayek,	The Constitution of Liberty	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1978)	at	205	
[Hayek].
5	 These	norms	of	legality	differ	according	to	the	specific	area	of	law.	The	principle	of	legality	in	criminal	law,	
for	example,	includes	the	prohibition	against	retroactive	criminalization	or	ex post facto laws	as	well	as	the	
void	for	vagueness	doctrine	with	respect	to	provisions	within	criminal	statutes.	On	the	relationship	between	
the	rule	of	law	and	vagueness	in	constitutional	law,	chiefly	in	the	criminal	law	area,	see	Marc	Ribeiro,	Limit-
ing Arbitrary Power: The Vagueness Doctrine in Canadian Constitutional Law	(Vancouver:	University	of	Brit-
ish	Columbia	Press,	2004).
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•	 formal	 legal	 equality	 so	 that	 every	 person—including	 and	 especially	 public	 offi-
cials—in	the	political	community	is	subject	to	the	law;	and
•	 constitutional	law	that	forms	a	binding	part	of	the	ordinary	law	of	the	land.
Common-law	courts,	in	this	model,	provide	the	institutional	connection	between	rights	
and	remedies	and	are	the	site	for	the	development	of	the	general	principles	of	the	common-
law	constitution.	According	to	Dicey,	judge-made	law	combined	with	an	unwritten	constitu-
tion	 represented	 a	 better	 mode	 of	 legal	 constraint	 than	 written	 codes	 and	 constitutions	
	because	they	were	less	vulnerable	to	executive	attempts	to	suspend	or	remove	rights.	To	take	
away	the	right	to	individual	freedom	in	the	English	constitution,	Dicey	wrote,	would	require	
“a	thorough	revolution	in	the	institutions	and	manners	of	the	nation.”6	In	a	common-law	
constitutional	system	like	Britain’s,	the	constitution	is	not	the	source,	but	the	consequence,	
of	the	rights	of	individuals	as	defined	and	enforced	by	the	common-law	courts.	Dicey	argued	
that	this	particular	institutional	advantage	of	the	courts	meant	that	they	were	best	placed	not	
only	to	control	the	political	executive	in	the	name	of	the	rule	of	law,	but	also	to	provide	su-
perior	protection	of	fundamental	values,	like	liberty	and	property,	in	the	English	polity.
In	 the	 Diceyan	 model,	 Parliament	 was	 sovereign	 and	 supreme.	 Parliament	 was	 the	
source	of	all	ordinary	 law7	and	ought	 to	be	 the	 source	of	all	governmental	power.	Any	
power	that	was	not	authorized	by	Parliament,	or	had	acted	beyond	the	powers	delegated	to	
it,	would	be	considered	ultra	vires	by	the	courts.	This	meant	that	administrative	law	played	
a	 particular	 controlling	 and	 legitimating	 function.	 In	 administrative	 law,	 the	 ultra	 vires	
principle	traditionally	provided	a	justification	for	curial	intervention	in	order	to	control	the	
scope	of	delegated	power.	Such	justification,	however,	rested	on	a	number	of	grounds,	in-
cluding	(1)	the	institutional	role	of	the	courts	as	the	principal	external	check	on	executive	
and	agency	powers;	(2)	the	specific	task	allocated	to	the	courts	through	administrative	law	
to	constrain	administrative	discretion	by	ensuring	that	an	administrative	body	did	not	over-
step	the	jurisdiction	that	the	legislature	had	set	down	in	the	statute;	and	(3)	the	judicial	per-
ception	that	a	fundamental	role	of	courts	was	to	protect	and	vindicate	the	private	autonomy	
of	affected	individuals,	primarily	through	common-law	rights	derived	from	contract,	tort,	
and	property.8	One	key	consequence	of	the	Diceyan	model	was	that	administrative	bodies	
were	viewed	with	distrust	as	almost	inherently	lawless	forms	of	governance.9	This	percep-
tion	 worsened	 when	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 Parliament	 could	 no	 longer	 provide	 proper	
	oversight	of	administrative	agencies	in	the	modern	state	through	regular	legislative	scrutiny	
or	through	political	practices	centring	on	ministerial	responsibility.
6	 See	Albert	V.	Dicey,	Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,	8th	ed.	(Holmes	Beach,	FL:	
Gaunt,	1996)	at	197.
7	 Ordinary	law	usually	means	domestic	law,	and	only	international	law	if	it	has	been	incorporated	by	Parlia-
ment.	This	chapter	focuses	on	domestic	law.	Gerald	Heckman,	in	chapter	12,	explores	the	relationship	be-
tween	international	human	rights	norms	and	administrative	law.
8	 For	a	more	detailed	exposition	of	the	implications	of	Dicey’s	ultra	vires	model,	see	Paul	P.	Craig,	“The	Nature	
and	Purpose	of	Administrative	Law”	in	Administrative Law,	5th	ed.	(London:	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2003)	at	3.
9	 See,	for	example,	Hayek’s	characteristic	overstatement:	“When	the	administration	interferes	with	the	private	
sphere	of	the	citizen	…	the	problem	of	discretion	becomes	relevant	to	us;	and	the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law,	
in	effect,	means	 that	 the	administrative	authorities	should	have	no	discretionary	powers	 in	 this	respect.”	
Hayek,	supra	note	4	at	213.
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In	contrast	to	Dicey’s	common-law	model,	which	offers	institutional	control	on	forms	
of	executive	discretion	through	the	judiciary,	Lon	Fuller’s	“inner	morality”	of	law	repre-
sents	a	procedural	approach	to	understanding	the	principle	of	legality.10	This	view	con-
cerns	law-making	as	an	activity	within	the	political	community—in	other	words,	the	laws	
of	lawfulness.	If	one	conceives	of	law	as	the	enterprise	of	subjecting	human	conduct	to	the	
governance	of	rules,	then	the	purpose	of	the	rule	of	law,	according	to	Fuller,	is	to	create	
and	sustain	a	framework	for	successful	social	interaction.	Compliance	occurs,	in	part,	be-
cause	citizens	derive	benefits	from	following	the	law.11	Lawmakers,	then,	have	an	interest	
in	optimizing	the	legal	conditions	necessary	for,	and	conducive	to,	voluntary	compliance	
and	cooperation.	Fuller’s	eight	principles	of	legality	aim	to	guide	lawmakers	in	achieving	
this	end:
•	 Laws	must	be	general.	The	principle	of	generality	ensures	that	laws	do	not	take	the	
form	of	ad	hoc	or	arbitrary	commands.12
•	 Laws	must	be	promulgated	and	public	because	secret	 laws	undermine	 legality	and	
frustrate	the	citizen’s	ability	to	know	where	he	or	she	stands	in	relation	to	a	system	of	
rights,	benefit	distribution,	and/or	enforcement	and	punishment.
•	 Laws	must	be	prospective,	not	retroactive.	This	means	that	laws	normally	should	seek	
to	control	present	and	future	behaviour,	not	past.	One	should	not	be	punished,	for	ex-
ample,	for	past	conduct	that	was	not	illegal	when	it	was	undertaken.
•	 Laws	must	be	non-contradictory	because	people	will	be	confused	about	how	to	com-
ply	if	they	are	pointed	in	two	different	directions.	Laws	should	be	neither	in	contradic-
tion	with	each	other	nor	internally	within	the	provisions	of	a	particular	statute.
•	 Laws	must	have	constancy	through	time.	Rapid	change	means	that	people	will	not	be	
able	to	adjust	their	patterns	of	behaviour	in	order	to	conform	to	the	new	rules.	More-
over,	inconstancy	suggests	arbitrariness	in	government	law-making.
•	 Laws	must	be	reasonably	clear.13
•	 Laws	must	be	capable	of	being	performed.	We	are	not	obliged	 to	obey	 laws	com-
manding	the	impossible.
•	 Congruence	between	the	rules	as	announced	and	the	rules	as	applied	must	exist	in	or-
der	 to	 avoid	 a	 legal	 system	 composed	 of	 arbitrary	 commands.	This	 last	 principle	
deeply	informs	discretionary	decision-making	in	the	administrative	state.
10	 See	Lon	L.	Fuller,	The Morality of Law,	rev.	ed.	(New	Haven	&	London:	Yale	University	Press,	1969)	at	33	
[Fuller].
11	 Hence	the	rule	of	law	provides	one	basis	for	the	duty	to	obey	the	law	and	invokes	concerns	about	when	it	is	
morally	appropriate	to	disobey	the	law.	For	a	discussion	of	the	relationship	between	the	duty	to	obey	the	law	
and	 the	 rule	of	 law,	 see	Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),	 [2002]	3	S.C.R.	519	at	paras.	6-64,	
90-121.
12	 Generality	also	ensures	that	the	law	applies	to	all	persons	in	the	polity:	general	rules	treat	like	cases	alike	in	
the	application	of	a	law	or	rule,	thereby	securing	fairness,	impartiality,	and	the	lack	of	bias.	Generality	also	
constrains	the	scope	of	discretion	in	discretionary	decision-making	by	drawing	the	individualized	decision	
back	toward	the	general	or	universal.
13	 This	feature	also	points	to	the	notion	of	arbitrariness	because	lawmakers	should	be	constrained	from	creating	
law	that	is	unreasonable,	illogical,	vague,	or	otherwise	ill-conceived.	Nevertheless,	this	principle	should	not	
be	taken	to	the	extremes	of	rigidity	for	“[a]	specious	clarity	can	be	more	damaging	than	an	honest	open-ended	
vagueness.”	Fuller,	supra	note	10	at	64.
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These	principles	act	as	eight	standards	of	legality	for	all	lawmakers	in	a	society	wishing	
to	be	governed	by,	and	 through,	 law.	These	principles	guide	 law-making	wherever	 it	 is	
found	in	the	state:	legislative,	judicial,	administrative,	customary,	and	so	on.	Unlike	Dicey,	
then,	Fuller’s	conception	of	legality	does	not	assume	that	administrative	bodies	are	inher-
ently	lawless.	Rather,	if	they	follow	these	principles,	they	may	be	more	likely	to	engage	in	
lawful	activity.	Fuller’s	“internal	morality”	of	law	represents	both	a	role	morality	(for	ex-
ample,	how	judges	should	decide	cases)	and	an	institutional	morality	(for	example,	how	
legislation	should	be	enacted)	that	regulate	whether	or	not	legal	activities	are	being	carried	
out	in	accordance	with	the	principles	that	constitute	that	same	activity.	If	these	activities	do	
not,	then	the	integrity	of	the	institution	will	be	severely	harmed	or	destroyed	altogether.	
Fuller	argued	that	a	political	order	committed	to	these	principles	would	generate	a	success-
ful	legal	system.	A	successful	legal	system,	in	turn,	is	itself	a	necessary—but	not	sufficient—
condition	for	ensuring	that	law	merits	respect	from	both	officials	and	citizens.
Joseph	Raz	provides	a	third	well-regarded	interpretation	of	the	rule	of	law.14	Though	in	
agreement	with	several	of	Fuller’s	views,	he	believes	it	is	possible	to	reduce	the	rule	of	law	
to	one	basic	idea:	law	must	be	capable	of	guiding	the	behaviour of	its	subjects.15	Raz	further	
claims	that	most	of	the	requirements	we	associate	with	the	rule	of	law	can	be	derived	from	
this	one	basic	idea	in	which	the	rule	of	law	as	the	principle	of	legality	acts	as	a	practical	guide	
for	making	effective	law,	thereby	constraining	the	harms	created	by	law	itself.	He	proposes	
eight	alternative	principles,	some	of	which	overlap	with	Fuller’s,	but	he	also	emphasizes	that	
his	theory	does	not	enumerate	all	of	the	possible	principles	associated	with	the	rule	of	law.	
As	with	Fuller,	his	principles	aim	to	guide	both	the	formation	and	application	of	law:
•	 Laws	should	be	prospective,	open,	and	clear.
•	 Laws	 should	be	 relatively	 stable	 in	order	 to	help	 individuals	with	 their	 short-	 and	
long-term	planning.
•	 Particular	laws	should	be	informed	by	open,	clear,	stable,	and	general	rules.	These	
first	three	principles	provide	standards	for	laws	to	guide	behaviour	effectively.
•	 The	independence	of	the	judiciary	must	be	guaranteed	in	order	to	preserve	the	rule	of	
law.	As	lawmakers,	the	judiciary	are	also	subject	to	the	first	three	principles	in	order	
to	control	the	exercise	of	their	own	discretionary	power.
•	 The	principles	of	natural	justice	must	be	observed,	such	as	fair	hearings	and	the	ab-
sence	of	bias.
•	 Courts	should	have	limited	review	powers	over	the	implementation	of	other	principles	
in	parliamentary	 legislation	and	administrative	decision-making	 in	order	 to	 ensure	
conformity	with	the	rule	of	law.
•	 Courts	should	be	easily	accessible.16
14	 See	also	Andrei	Marmor,	who	claims	to	hold	a	position	in	between	those	articulated	by	Fuller	and	Raz,	in	
“The	Rule	of	Law	and	Its	Limits”	(2004)	23	Law	&	Phil.	1.
15	 Joseph	Raz,	 “The	Rule	of	Law	and	 Its	Virtue,”	 in	The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality	
	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1979)	at	214	[Raz,	The Authority of Law].
16	 Raz	offers	no	views	on	how	such	access	should	be	realized	in	practice,	and	whether	or	not	this	access	to	the	
courts	is	a	positive	duty	on	government.	Nevertheless,	he	writes:	“Long	delays	or	excessive	costs	may	ef-
fectively	turn	the	most	enlightened	law	into	a	dead	letter	and	frustrate	one’s	ability	effectively	to	guide	one-
self	by	the	law.”	Ibid.	at	217.
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•	 The	discretion	of	crime-preventing	agencies,	such	as	the	police,	should	not	be	allowed	
to	pervert	the	law.	Principles	four	to	eight	ensure	that	the	legal	machinery	of	enforcing	
the	law	is	not	distorted,	is	capable	of	supervising	conformity	to	the	rule	of	law,	and	
can	provide	effective	remedies	when	the	legal	system	deviates	from	it.17
The	rule	of	law	is	essentially	a	negative	value	in	Raz’s	theory	and,	moreover,	is	primari-
ly	instrumental—that	is,	it	is	primarily	a	means	to	the	achievement	of	other	goals.18	Be-
cause	law	creates	the	danger	of	arbitrary	power,	the	rule	of	law	acts	to	minimize	this	risk,	
thereby	minimizing	harms	created	by	law	itself.	Raz’s	theory	constrains	the	form,	produc-
tion,	and	application	of	law,	but	it	does	not	provide	the	grounds	on	which	to	judge	the	con-
tent	of	law.	On	his	account,	overbreadth,	for	example,	is	a	technical	deficiency	of	law	that	
makes	it	more	likely	that	the	law	will	cause	harm	by	(1)	not	adequately	constraining	the	use	
of	power;	(2)	not	providing	guidance	for	individual	behaviour;	or	(3)	widening	the	poten-
tial	to	infringe	a	specific	right,	such	as	individual	liberty.	Vagueness	may	present	similar	
risks.	A	lack	of	generality,	on	the	other	hand,	may	violate	legal	equality	or	individual	digni-
ty	interests	because	the	classification	or	categorization	may	disproportionately	“single	out”	
a	particular	segment	of	the	population.	A	lack	of	generality	may	also	indicate	negative	dis-
crimination	on	the	grounds	of	race	or	sexual	preference,	but	Raz’s	concept	of	the	rule	of	
law	does	not	address	this	kind	of	content	violation.	Nevertheless,	the	rule	of	law	has	great	
moral	value	because	conformity	to	it	is	a	moral	virtue,	and	it	is	a	moral	requirement	to	en-
able	law	to	perform	useful	social	functions	or	serve	a	moral	purpose.	The	rule	of	law,	then,	
fulfills	an	important	but	subservient	role	because	conformity	to	the	rule	of	law	is	not	the	ul-
timate	goal.	The	idea	of	the	rule	of	law	stands	as	only	one	ideal	for	government;	there	are	
many	others,	and	some	will	take	priority	over	the	rule	of	law.19
The	chief	reason	underpinning	this	perspective	on	the	rule	of	law	is	Raz’s	insistence	on	
the	liberal	principle	of	state	neutrality	with	respect	to	the	many	comprehensive	conceptions	
of	a	good	life	that	each	of	us	holds.	Though	he	argues	that	the	state	cannot	remain	morally	
neutral	about	harmful	activities	or	beliefs,	it	should	guarantee	as	far	as	possible	the	freedom	
of	individuals	to	pursue	their	own	conceptions	of	the	good	or	“to	choose	styles	and	forms	
of	life.”20	The	instrumental	virtue	of	the	rule	of	law,	then,	establishes	a	secure	framework	
for	leading	one’s	life,	facilitates	and	protects	the	exercise	of	individual	freedom,	and	is	a	
necessary	component	of	a	state	that	respects	human	dignity.	But,	warns	Raz,	the	rule	of	law	
should	not	be	confused	with	the	rule	of	good	law.21	On	this	account,	for	example,	the	guar-
17	 Cristie	Ford,	in	chapter	3,	describes	the	variety	of	administrative	law	remedies	a	tribunal	might	impose	as	
well	as	those	available	through	judicial	review.
18	 Raz, The Authority of Law,	supra	note	15	at	223-26,	228.
19	 In	contrast	to	Fuller,	Raz	does	not	agree	that	deviations	from	the	rule	of	law	cannot	be	total	or	radical,	or	that	
there	must	necessarily	be	some	moral	value	in	a	legal	system	committed	to	the	rule	of	law.
20	 Raz,	The Authority of Law,	supra	note	15	at	220.
21	 Raz,	ibid.	at	211,	asserts	that	the	rule	of	law	is	“not	to	be	confused	with	democracy,	justice,	equality	(before	the	
law	or	otherwise),	human	rights	of	any	kind	or	respect	for	persons	or	for	the	dignity	of	man.	A	non-democratic	
	legal	system,	based	on	the	denial	of	human	rights,	on	extensive	poverty,	on	racial	segregation,	sexual	in-
equalities,	and	religious	persecution	may,	in	principle,	conform	to	the	requirements	of	the	rule	of	law	better	
than	any	of	the	legal	systems	of	the	more	enlightened	Western	democracies.	This	does	not	mean	that	it	will	
be	better	than	those	Western	democracies.	It	will	be	an	immeasurably	worse	legal	system,	but	it	will	excel	
in	one	respect:	in	its	conformity	to	the	rule	of	law.”
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antee	of	legal	equality	in	the	rule	of	law	helps	identify	apparent	violations	of	formal	equal-
ity,	but	it	does	not	demand	the	realization	of	full	or	substantive	equality.22	Or,	to	take	anoth-
er	example,	a	rule	of	law	state	may,	in	principle,	be	compatible	with	both	a	laissez-faire	
capitalist	society	as	well	as	a	society	whose	government	creates	redistributive	programs	to	
mitigate	the	pernicious	effects	of	social	and	economic	inequality.
How	might	each	of	these	theories	inform	judicial	understandings	of	their	role	in	a	rule	
of	law	order?	The	rule	of	law,	for	example,	seems	to	entail	an	explicit	role	for	the	judiciary,	
but	for	what	function?	Dicey	considered	the	courts	to	be	the	chief	rule	of	law	check	on	the	
executive	in	a	Westminster	system	of	government	and,	later,	the	primary	means	to	control	
delegations	of	discretion	from	the	executive	to	the	administrative	state.	The	Diceyan	model	
therefore	conceived	of	administrative	 law	as	 the	means	 through	which	 the	courts	could	
control	government	power	 in	order	 to	protect	 individual	 rights.	Such	a	view	meant	 that	
courts	need	not	defer	to,	or	show	respect	for,	the	decisions	made	by	administrative	bodies	
that	implicated	common-law	rights	and	interests.	Courts,	however,	gradually	became	aware	
of	the	problems	of	legitimacy	when	intervening	in	administrative	agencies	and	sought	to	
set	some	limits	to	the	exercise	of	their	own	discretionary	powers.	Although	courts	were	
wary	about	too	overtly	substituting	their	views	for	those	of	the	agency	when	they	held	a	
different	opinion	about	the	merits	of	the	decision,	they	could	still	intervene	easily	through	
their	approach	to	statutory	interpretation.	Through	their	approach	to	statutory	interpreta-
tion,	courts	could	argue	that	intervention	was	justified	when	the	legislature	intended	that	
questions	of	law	or	mixed	fact	and	law	implicated	the	jurisdiction	of	the	agency,	thereby	
requiring	judicial	review.	Equally	missing	from	Dicey’s	model	are	other	functions	of	ad-
ministrative	law	such	as	ensuring	accountability	in	government	by	facilitating	participation	
in	the	decision-making	process—what	the	Fullerian	approach	endorses.	Also	lacking	is	the	
function	of	administrative	law	to	design	principles,	standards,	and	rules	in	order	to	ensure	
that	government	performs	its	tasks	efficiently	and	fairly—a	view	made	explicit	in	Raz’s	
theory.
The	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	also	requires	an	institutional	framework,	though	not	a	
specific	institutional	arrangement:	Dicey	recommends	a	common-law	legal	system,	Fuller	
discusses	law-making	in	general	and	as	a	shared	and	ideally	cooperative	institutional	en-
terprise,	while	Raz	emphasizes	judicial	independence	as	a	necessary	component	of	the	rule	
of	law.	It	is	also	clear	that	the	idea	of	the	rule	of	law	suggests	a	role	for	the	courts,	and	that	
this	role	depends	on	a	political	choice	in	the	arrangement	of	institutions,	as	well	as	a	politi-
cal	choice	concerning	the	distribution	of	power	among	them.	In	political	theory,	the	rule	
of	law	generally	functions	as	a	political	ideal	and	suggests	the	need	for	legal	institutions,	
a	framework	of	positive	law,	and	a	constitutional	order	(with	either	a	written	or	unwritten	
22	 For	a	contrary,	radical	argument,	see	Robin	West,	Re-imagining Justice: Progressive Interpretations of For-
mal Equality, Rights, and the Rule of Law	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2003).	West,	at	151,	emphasizes	the	potential	
of	the	rule	of	law	to	advance	substantive	equality	in	society	through	formal	legal	equality:	“The	point	of	law,	
then,	and	the	point	of	formal	equality	both,	is	to	recognize	the	humanity	of	all,	and	their	inclusion	in	a	com-
munity	constituted	by	mutual	regard,	and	to	extend	the	reach	of	that	community	well	past	the	point	by	which	
we	would	be	sympathetically	and	naturally	inclined	to	do	so:	to	extend	it	to	the	outmost	reach	of	the	law	it-
self.”	On	this	view,	the	broadest	scope	of	the	rule	of	law	can	help	create	an	egalitarian	and	inclusive	com-
munity	of	civic	equals.	This	community	of	equals	is	based	on	sympathetic	engagement	and	concern	for	the	
well-being	of	others	and	moves	the	rule	of	law	away	from	its	usual	identification	with	fear	of	others,	individual	
self-interest,	and	mistrust	of	government	power.
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	constitution—or	both	in	the	Canadian	case).23	Here	the	concept	of	the	rule	of	law	organizes	
other	institutional	matters,	such	as	the	doctrine	of	the	separation	of	powers,	the	process	of	
appointing	judges,	institutional	checks	and	balances,	and	the	fundamental	precept	that	no	
one	in	a	rule	of	law	regime	is	above	the	law,	particularly	political	actors	in	government.
The	doctrine	of	the	separation	of	powers	provides	a	rationale	for	an	institutional	arrange-
ment	that	effectively	functions	to	check	arbitrary	power.24	This	doctrine,	for	example,	makes	
explicit	the	separate	function	of	courts	in	securing	a	political	community	committed	to	po-
litical	moderation,	 the	maintenance	of	order,	 political	 liberty,	 and	 the	prevention	of	 the	
abuse	of	power	by	all	branches	of	government.	Canada’s	Westminster	system	of	govern-
ment,	 however,	 cannot	 be	 characterized	 by	 bright-line	 distinctions	 between	 the	 three	
branches.	A	certain	fluidity	is	endemic	to	this	system,	particularly	among	the	executive,	
Cabinet,	and	bureaucracy,	with	significant	implications	for	the	legislature.25	Nevertheless,	
one	implication	of	the	separation	of	powers	is	that	the	judiciary	should	have	some	measure	
of	independence—but	what	is	the	nature	of	this	independence	and	how	much	independence	
do	judges	need?	Moreover,	how	is	judicial	independence	related	to	the	independence	of	persons	
appointed	to	administrative	bodies	such	as	tribunals?	As	discussed	by	Laverne	Jacobs	in	
chapter	6,	the	Supreme	Court	has	identified	three	objective	conditions	necessary	to	guaran-
tee	 functional	 independence:	 security	 of	 tenure,	 financial	 security,	 and	 administrative	
control.26
These	three	features	informing	the	principle	of	judicial	independence	also	apply	to	adju-
dicators	in	the	administrative	state	who	engage	in	more	judicial-like	decision-making	in	tri-
bunal	settings.	Though	the	rationale	for	judicial	independence	does	not	exactly	map	onto	the	
requirements	 for	 independence	 in	 the	 administrative	 state—given	 executive	 control	 of	
	administrative	bodies—strong	analogies	exist.	But	just	as	courts	cannot	treat	administrative	
23	 Canada,	as	a	 former	British	colony,	not	only	possesses	a	written	constitution,	but	has	also	 inherited	 the	
	“unwritten”	British	constitution.	In	Britain,	the	constitution	is	said	to	be	unwritten	because	no	single	consti-
tutional	document	defines	its	constitutional	system.	Instead,	a	collection	of	statutes,	decrees,	conventions,	
customs	or	traditions,	and	royal	prerogatives	comprise	the	constitution.	Seen	from	this	perspective,	it	would	
be	a	mistake	to	think	that	a	single	document,	even	if	comprehensive,	could	ever	capture	an	entire	constitu-
tion.	For	most	countries,	a	constitution	is	a	mix	of	written	and	unwritten	sources.	In	Canada,	as	will	be	con-
sidered	in	more	detail	in	part	III,	several	of	the	most	important	constitutional	principles	are	implicit	and	
unwritten.
24	 For	discussion	of	 the	 separation	of	powers	 in	 constitutional	 jurisprudence,	 see	Newfoundland (Treasury 
Board) v. N.A.P.E.,	[2004]	3	S.C.R.	38;	Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education),	[2003]	3	
S.C.R.	3;	Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission),	[1996]	3	S.C.R.	854	[Cooper];	Wells v. Newfound-
land,	[1999]	3	S.C.R.	199	[Wells];	and Operation Dismantle v. The Queen,	[1985]	1	S.C.R.	441	[Operation 
Dismantle].
25	 As	the	Supreme	Court	writes	in	Wells,	supra	note	24	at	paras.	52,	54:	“The	doctrine	of	separation	of	powers	
is	an	essential	feature	of	our	constitution.	It	maintains	a	separation	of	powers	between	the	judiciary	and	the	
other	two	branches,	legislature	and	the	executive,	and	to	some	extent	between	the	legislature	and	the	execu-
tive.	…	The	separation	of	powers	is	not	a	rigid	and	absolute	structure.	The	Court	should	not	be	blind	to	the	
reality	of	Canadian	governance	that,	except	in	certain	rare	cases,	the	executive	frequently	and	de facto con-
trols	the	legislature.”
26	 Cases	that	specify	these	three	conditions	include	R. v. Valente, [1985]	2	S.C.R.	673;	Beauregard v. Canada,	
[1986]	2	S.C.R.	56;	and	Provincial Court Judges Association of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister 
of Justice),	[2005]	2	S.C.R.	286.
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bodies	as	they	do	lower	courts	in	the	hierarchy	of	legal	institutions,	courts	cannot	understand	
administrative	independence	as	an	exact	analogy.	In	chapter	6,	Laverne	Jacobs	more	thor-
oughly	 treats	 the	complexities	 involved	 in	 tribunal	 independence,	 including	 the	appoint-
ments	and	removal	processes,	the	guarantees	of	impartiality	and	lack	of	bias,	and	whether	or	
not	explicit	and	implicit	constitutional	guarantees	apply.27	She	discusses	how	courts	tradi-
tionally	distrusted	administrative	agencies,	partly	due	to	the	blurred	lines	of	accountability,	
which	seemingly	violated	the	doctrine	of	the	separation	of	powers.	In	other	words,	because	
they	are	hybrid	bodies,	or	“governments	in	miniature,”28	administrative	agencies	and	tribu-
nals	 possess	 differing	 combinations	 of	 policy-making,	 rule-making,	 and	 adjudication,	
which	make	their	purposes	and	functions	difficult	 to	separate.29	Even	now,	the	Supreme	
Court	describes	administrative	tribunals	as	creatures	of	statute	that	“span	the	constitutional	
divide	between	the	judiciary	and	the	executive”30	and	that	have	a	significant	policy-making	
role.	Moreover,	and	in	contrast	to	courts,	one	vital	function	of	tribunals	is	the	greater	op-
portunity	for	participation	by	those	affected	by	the	decision-making	process.	Once	again,	a	
certain	flexibility	and	attentiveness	to	context	inheres	in	the	rule	of	law	relationship	be-
tween	courts	and	administrative	bodies	in	the	doctrine	of	the	separation	of	powers.
III.  the SuPreMe court of canada on the 
rule of law’S SIgnIfIcance
Legal	and	political	theories	constitute	the	often	unstated	background	assumptions	that	in-
form	judicial	understandings	of	the	rule	of	law	that	appear	jurisprudentially	in	case-by-case	
development.	The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	has	articulated	various	features	of	the	rule	of	
law,	but	 the	Court	has	not	(and	perhaps	never	should)	set	out	a	comprehensive	statement	
containing	a	fully	articulated	conception	of	the	rule	of	law.
a.  the heart of the canadian rule of law
The	marked	difference	between	formal	and	substantive	approaches	to	the	rule	of	law	can	
be	seen	in	an	early	Supreme	Court	case	concerning	the	ability	of	courts	to	control	the	abuse	
of	power	in	the	administrative	state.	The	case	of	Roncarelli v. Duplessis31	contains	several	
examples	of	arbitrary	power:	the	existence	of	unlimited	discretionary	powers	in	an	agency;	
a	decision-maker	acting	in	bad	faith;	inappropriate	responsiveness	to	an	individual	situation	
where	important	interests	are	at	stake;	consideration	of	irrelevant	factors	in	the	decision;	
27	 See,	in	particular,	Jacobs’s	discussion	of	McKenzie v. Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General et al.,	
2006	BCSC	1372,	a	case	concerning	procedural	fairness,	tribunal	independence,	the	rule	of	law,	and	the	dis-
missal	of	a	residential	tenancy	arbitrator	for	arbitrary	reasons.	Online:	<http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/
doc/2006/2006bcsc1372/2006bcsc1372.pdf>.
28	 I	borrow	this	phrase	 from	John	Willis,	an	 important	early	Canadian	public	 law	scholar.	See	“Three	Ap-
proaches	to	Administrative	Law:	The	Judicial,	the	Conceptual	and	the	Functional”	(1935)	U.T.L.J.	53	at	73.	
See	also	Mary	Liston,	“Willis,	‘Theology,’	and	the	Rule	of	Law”	(2005)	55	U.T.L.J.	767.
29	 In	chapter	2,	Bill	Bogart	outlines	the	many	regulatory	functions	and	tools	in	the	administrative	state.
30	 Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), 
[2001]	2	S.C.R.	781	at para.	24.
31	 [1959]	S.C.R.	121	[Roncarelli].
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disregard	of	the	purpose	of	a	statute;	and	dictation	of	the	decision	by	an	external	and	unau-
thorized	person.	Roncarelli	illustrates	one	of	the	primary	functions	of	the	rule	of	law:	the	
control	of	executive	arbitrariness.32
Frank	Roncarelli	owned	a	Montreal	 restaurant	and	was	a	 Jehovah’s	Witness.	At	 that	
time,	the	Quebec	government	and	the	Catholic	Church	joined	forces	to	persecute	Jehovah’s	
Witnesses,	whom	they	viewed	as	dangerous	to	the	established	order,	seditious,	and	anti-
Catholic.	Hundreds	of	Jehovah’s	Witnesses	were	jailed	for	distributing	religious	pamphlets	
in	 violation	 of	municipal	 bylaws.	Roncarelli	 posted	 bail	 for	 fellow	Witnesses.	 Premier	
Duplessis	publicly	warned	Roncarelli	to	stop	posting	bail,	and,	when	Roncarelli	continued,	
Duplessis	ordered	that	the	liquor	board	cancel	Roncarelli’s	permit	to	sell	alcohol.	The	can-
cellation	of	the	liquor	licence	forced	Roncarelli	to	shut	down	his	restaurant.	
The	Supreme	Court	examined	the	actions	of	Maurice	Duplessis,	who	acted	as	both	pre-
mier	and	attorney	general,	and	found	them	invalid.	Invoking	the	unwritten	principle	of	the	
rule	of	law,	the	Court	held	that	no	public	official	is	above	the	law.	Duplessis	had	stepped	
outside	the	authorized	bounds	of	his	power	as	attorney	general	by	ordering	the	revocation	
of	Roncarelli’s	licence.	He	also	inappropriately	exercised	the	power	that	was	properly	giv-
en	to	the	chairperson	of	the	Quebec	Liquor	Commission	by	the	enabling	statute,	An Act 
Respecting Alcoholic Liquor.	Last,	regardless	of	who	actually	was	the	decision-maker,	the	
decision	offended	the	rule	of	law	because	the	substance	of	the	decision	was	incompatible	
with	the	purpose	of	the	statute.	Being	a	Jehovah’s	Witness	was	irrelevant	to	a	decision	con-
cerning	the	continuation	of	a	liquor	licence	for	operating	a	restaurant.	The	true	nature	of	the	
decision	was	to	punish	Roncarelli	for	exercising	his	civil	right	to	post	bail.
There	 are	 two	ways	 to	 understand	 the	 use	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 this	
	judgment:	the	formal	Diceyan	model,	discussed	in	part	II,	above;	and	a	more	value-laden	sub-
stantive	constitutionalism,	or	what	David	Dyzenhaus	calls	the	unwritten	“constitution	of	legal-
ity.”33	On	the	Diceyan	model,	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	Chairman	Edouard	Archambault	
of	the	Quebec	Liquor	Commission	had	not	made	a	decision	at	all	because	Duplessis	had	sub-
stituted	his	decision	for	that	of	the	proper	authority,	thus	exercising	his	power	arbitrarily.	The	
case	confirmed	that	Premier	Duplessis	had	overstepped	his	jurisdiction	as	attorney	general	by,	
in	effect,	telling	Chairman	Archambault	to	cancel	Roncarelli’s	liquor	licence	“forever”	so	that	
his	restaurant	would	go	out	of	business.	Under	the	terms	of	the	governing	statute,	however,	
this	power	had	been	delegated	to	Chairman	Archambault,	not	to	the	attorney	general	who,	at	
most,	could	only	provide	advice	on	the	matter.34	The	legal	wrong	committed	against	the	rule	
of	law	here	was	the	violation	of	the	legal	principle	of	validity,	which	affirms	that	“every	offi-
cial	act	must	be	justified	by	law”	or	be	found	ultra	vires:	the	decision	was	not	valid	because	
the	power	to	cancel	licences	was	not	given	to	either	the	premier	or	the	attorney	general.35	As	
32	 For	a	detailed	exposition	of	the	relation	between	the	rule	of	law	and	the	administrative	state	in	administrative	
law,	see	David	Mullan	et al.,	“Chapter	One:	The	Administrative	State	and	the	Rule	of	Law”	in	Administra-
tive Law: Cases, Text, and Materials,	5th	ed.	(Toronto:	Emond	Montgomery,	2003).
33	 See	David	Dyzenhaus,	“The	Deep	Structure	of	Roncarelli	v.	Duplessis”	(2004)	53	U.N.B.L.J.	111	at	124.
34	 Alternatively,	and	to	paraphrase	Don	Corleone	in	The Godfather,	Duplessis	provided	“advice,”	the	nature	of	
which	Archambault	could	not	refuse.
35	 This	is	the	view	taken	by	Peter	Hogg,	Constitutional Law of Canada: 2001 Student Edition	(Toronto:	Cars-
well,	2001)	at	634	[Hogg].
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Dyzenhaus	points	out,	the	problem	with	this	line	of	argument	is	that	had	Archambault	not	
consulted	Duplessis,	his	decision	would	have	been	found	valid,	particularly	because	the	
enabling	statute	granted	Archambault	seemingly	unfettered	discretion.36	Indeed,	the	rele-
vant	provision	of	the	statute,	s.	34,	simply	and	broadly	stated	that	the	Commission	“may	
refuse	to	grant	any	permit.”	On	this	basis,	only	when	an	administrative	authority	acts	be-
yond	the	power	given	to	it	by	Parliament	can	the	courts	legitimately	enforce	the	rule	of	law	
or	reaffirm	the	separation	of	powers.
By	contrast,	Rand	J.,	writing	in	a	concurring	judgment	for	the	majority,	stated	that	pub-
lic	authorities,	especially	those	with	broad	discretionary	powers,	are	always	constrained	by	
the	unwritten	constitutional	principle	of	the	rule	of	law,	even	when	the	legislation	contains	
no	explicit	or	written	constraints:
In	public	regulation	of	this	sort	there	is	no	such	thing	as	absolute	and	untrammelled	“discre-
tion,”	that	is	that	action	can	be	taken	on	any	ground	or	for	any	reason	that	can	be	suggested	to	
the	mind	of	the	administrator;	no	legislative	Act	can,	without	express	language,	be	taken	to	
contemplate	an	unlimited	arbitrary	power	exercisable	for	any	purpose,	however	capricious	or	
irrelevant,	regardless	of	the	nature	or	purpose	of	the	statute.	…	“Discretion”	necessarily	im-
plies	good	faith	in	discharging	public	duty;	there	is	always	a	perspective	within	which	a	statute	
is	intended	to	operate;	and	any	clear	departure	from	its	lines	or	objects	is	just	as	objectionable	
as	fraud	or	corruption.37
Even	if	Archambault	had	acted	on	his	own	in	cancelling	Roncarelli’s	licence,	he	would	
have	used	his	discretionary	powers	inappropriately	according	to	Rand	J.	because	his	deci-
sion	contradicted	the	substantive	content	of	the	rule	of	law:
That,	in	the	presence	of	expanding	administrative	regulation	of	economic	activities,	such	a	step	
and	its	consequences	are	to	be	suffered	by	the	victim	without	recourse	or	remedy,	that	an	ad-
ministration	according	to	law	is	to	be	superseded	by	action	dictated	by	and	according	to	the	ar-
bitrary	likes,	dislikes	and	irrelevant	purposes	of	public	officers	acting	beyond	their	duty,	would	
signalize	the	beginning	of	disintegration	of	the	rule	of	law	as	a	fundamental	postulate	of	our	
constitutional	structure.	An	administration	of	licences	on	the	highest	level	of	fair	and	impartial	
treatment	to	all	may	be	forced	to	follow	the	practice	of	“first	come,	first	served,”	which	makes	
the	strictest	observance	of	equal	responsibility	to	all	of	even	greater	importance.38
Conventionally	in	public	law,	the	rule	of	law’s	constraints	on	government	actors	seeks	to	
prevent	such	“[virtual]	vocation	outlawry”	through	enforcement	of	the	purpose	of	the	stat-
ute	and	good	faith	decision-making	achieved	through	the	use	of	fair	procedures.39	Rand	J.	
added	more	content:	the	administrative	tribunal	violated	Roncarelli’s	rights	as	a	citizen—
freedom	of	 religion,	 freedom	of	 expression,	 freedom	 to	 pursue	 his	 livelihood—thereby	
damaging	the	normative	relationship	between	the	state	and	the	citizen.
On	the	formalist	account,	administrative	law	concerns	the	written	statutes,	rules,	and	
principles	that	govern	public	decision-makers,	encompassing	the	relationships	among	all	
36	 Supra	note	33	at	125.
37	 Roncarelli,	supra	note	31	at	140.
38	 Ibid. at	142.
39	 Ibid.	at	141.
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branches	of	government	as	well	as	the	relationships	between	branches	of	government	and	
the	groups,	constituencies,	corporations,	and	individuals	with	whom	they	interact	and	over	
whom	they	exercise	power.	Public	decision-makers	must	not	act	outside	 their	authority,	
must	not	abuse	their	authority,	and	must	be	seen	not	to	do	so	either.	Administrative	law	es-
tablishes	the	legal	parameters	of	power	that	exist	by	virtue	of	statutes	(such	as	delegated	
discretionary	powers	given	to	administrators)	or	because	of	royal	prerogative—prerogative	
that	is	now	mostly	exercised	by	the	executive	in	the	name	of	the	Crown.	Judicial	scrutiny	
within	administrative	law	focuses	on	the	limits	on	the	authority	given	to	decision-makers	
by	statute	or	prerogative.	On	the	substantive	account,	such	authority	is	bounded	by	the	pur-
pose	and	terms	of	the	statute,	by	regulations	and	guidelines,	by	the	constitution,	and	by	
both	written	and	unwritten	legal	principles.	Formally	valid	exercises	of	discretion	can	of-
fend	the	rule	of	law	and	can	subsequently	be	determined	to	be	a	legal	wrong	as	an	abuse	of	
power.	Roncarelli	still	stands	as	a	paradigmatic	example	of	the	deeper	principled	and	pur-
posive	approach	to	understanding	how	the	rule	of	law	animates	administrative	law.
B.  a foundational Principle, but an “unwritten” one
As	a	constitutional	principle,	the	rule	of	law	is	both	part	of	the	written	and	(so-called)	unwrit-
ten	constitution.	A	constitution	is	more	than	the	positive	law:	it	includes	customary	law,	con-
ventions,	judge-made	or	common-law,	a	civil	code,	and	unwritten	principles	in	addition	to	
legislation	and	written	constitutional	documents.40	As	an	implicit	constitutional	principle,	the	
rule	of	law	appears	in	the	preamble	to	the	Constitution Act, 1867,	where	it	states	that	Canada	
will	have	a	“Constitution	similar	in	principle	to	that	of	the	United	Kingdom.”41	The	rule	of	
law	 also	 appears	 as	 an	 explicit	 principle	 in	 the	 preamble	 to	 the	Constitution Act, 1982:	
“Whereas	Canada	is	founded	upon	principles	that	recognize	the	supremacy	of	God	and	the	
rule	of	law.”42	Whether	implicit	or	explicit,	then,	the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	applies	to	
the	entire	constitutional	order	and	every	part	of	government.	The	deepest	and	broadest	reflec-
tion	on	the	unwritten	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	in	the	Canadian	order	appears	in	two	refer-
ence	cases:43	the	Manitoba Language Rights Reference44	and	the	Secession Reference.45
40	 For	further	discussion	of	written	and	unwritten	constitutions,	see	supra	note	23	and	accompanying	text.
41	 Preamble	to	the	Constitution Act, 1867	(U.K.),	30	&	31	Vict.,	c.	3,	reprinted	in	R.S.C.	1985,	App.	II,	No.	5.
42	 Preamble	to	the	Constitution Act, 1982,	being	Schedule	B	to	the	Canada Act 1982	(U.K.),	1982,	c.	11.
43	 Reference	cases	constitute	another	institutional	practice	that	blurs	the	bright-line	distinction	between	law	
and	politics.	They	have	allowed	Canadian	courts	to	articulate,	from	a	legal	perspective,	their	understanding	
of	the	constitutional	architecture	and	its	normative	underpinnings—a	perspective	that	usually	remains	im-
plicit	and	underspecified	in	ordinary	judgments.	Because	the	reference	function	is	advisory,	it	is	also	non-
judicial,	and	thus	upsets	the	traditional	understanding	of	the	separation	of	powers	doctrine.	Mitigating	this	
potential	doctrinal	disruption	is	the	fact	that	a	court’s	answer	is	neither	binding	nor	of	the	same	precedential	
weight	as	an	opinion	in	an	actual	legal	judgment.	Nevertheless,	there	are	no	reported	examples	of	an	opinion	
being	disregarded	by	the	parties,	which	suggests	that	references	are	treated	like	other	opinions.	The	key	dis-
tinction	between	reference	opinions	and	other	 judicial	opinions	 is	 the	 limited	range	of	remedies	 that	are	
available	to	the	judiciary	in	reference	cases.	See	Hogg,	supra	note	35	at	8.6(d).
44	 Reference re Language Rights Under s. 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 of Constitutional Act, 1867,	
[1985]	1	S.C.R.	721	[Manitoba Language Rights Reference].
45	 Reference re Secession of Quebec,	[1998]	2	S.C.R.	217	[Secession Reference].
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In	Manitoba Language Rights Reference,	the	Supreme	Court	described	the	rule	of	law	
as	a	“highly	textured	expression	…	conveying	…	a	sense	of	orderliness,	of	subjection	to	
known	legal	rules	and	of	executive	accountability	to	legal	authority.”46	The	Court	also	rec-
ognized	the	rule	of	law	as	a	“fundamental	postulate	of	our	constitutional	structure”47	whose	
constitutional	status	was	beyond	question.	In	coming	to	this	understanding,	the	Court	con-
sidered	several	features	of	the	rule	of	law	including	the	principle	of	legality,	the	institutional	
arrangements	entailed	by	the	idea	of	the	rule	of	law,	and	its	broader	connection	with	Can-
adian	political	culture.	Throughout	the	judgment,	the	Court	characterized	the	rule	of	law	as	
the	principle	of	legality.	This	principle	was	understood	in	two	ways.	First,	it	meant	that	the	
law	is	supreme	over	government	officials	as	well	as	private	individuals	and	therefore	ex-
cludes	the	influence	and	operation	of	arbitrary	power.48	Second,	it	meant	that	law	and	order	
are	indispensable	elements	of	civilized	life	within	a	political	community.	The	rule	of	law	
therefore	required	“the	creation	and	maintenance	of	an	actual	order	of	positive	laws	which	
preserves	and	embodies	the	more	general	principle	of	normative	order.	Law	and	order	are	
indispensable	elements	of	civilized	life.”49	For	the	Court,	Canada	must	be	thought	of	as	a	
“society	of	legal	order	and	normative	structure”50	in	which	the	rule	of	law	was	embedded	
as	both	an	implicit	and	explicit	constitutional	principle.	As	an	expression	of	a	commitment	
to	peace,	order,	and	good	government	over	war,	anarchy,	and	arbitrary	power,	the	rule	of	
law,	to	the	Court’s	mind,	represented	a	“philosophical	view	of	society”	that	“in	the	Western	
tradition	is	linked	with	basic	democratic	notions.”51
How	the	principle	of	legality	is	linked	to	basic	democratic	notions	was	not	spelled	out	fully	
in	the	Manitoba Language Rights Reference.	Nevertheless,	the	Court	stated	that	the	consti-
tution	is	deeply	intertwined	with	the	principle	of	parliamentary	sovereignty,	for	the	consti-
tution	“is	a	statement	of	the	will	of	the	people	to	be	governed	in	accordance	with	certain	
principles	held	as	fundamental	and	certain	prescriptions	restrictive	of	the	powers	of	legis-
lature	and	government.”52	 In	Canada,	 the	people	have	elected	 to	be	governed	 through	a	
democracy,	its	institutional	forms,	and	its	political	ideals.	Democracy	and	parliamentary	
sovereignty,	 then,	 are	 related	but	not	 synonymous.	Moreover,	Canadians	have	also	em-
braced	government	under	 the	concept	of	 the	 rule	of	 law.	The	 interconnectedness	of	 the	
principles	of	democracy,	parliamentary	sovereignty,	and	the	rule	of	law	inform	general	un-
derstandings	of	what	good	or	responsible	government	means.	In	the	Manitoba Language 
Rights Reference,	the	Court	invoked	the	rule	of	law	to	conclude	that	the	Manitoba	govern-
ment’s	repeated	failure	to	respect	the	mandatory	constitutional	requirements	of	bilingualism	
exhibited	a	failure	to	comply	with	the	manner	and	form	of	the	legislative	enactment	and	
therefore	rendered	the	legislative	product	invalid.	By	failing	to	adhere	to	the	terms	of	the	
province’s	constitutional	document,	Manitoba	had	acted	without	legal	authority,	had	acted	
46	 Manitoba Language Rights Reference, supra	note	44	at	para.	62.
47	 Ibid.	at	para.	63.
48	 Ibid.	at	para.	59.
49	 Ibid.	at	para.	60.
50	 Ibid.	at	para.	64.
51	 Ibid.	at	para.	61.
52	 Ibid. at	para.	48.
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arbitrarily,	and	had	allowed	its	officials	to	act	outside	the	law.	The	Court	concluded	that	
these	actions	constituted	a	complete	transgression	of	the	principle	of	legality.	The	remedial	
force	of	the	rule	of	law	compelled	bilingual	enactment	of	all	unilingual	provincial	laws.
In	the	Secession Reference,	the	Court	more	clearly	articulated	the	constitutional	princi-
ple	of	the	rule	of	law	in	the	context	of	questions	about	the	legal	validity	of	a	potential	uni-
lateral	act	of	secession	from	Canada	by	the	province	of	Quebec.	In	this	judgment,	the	Court	
identified	four	unwritten	principles	that	animate	the	Canadian	constitutional	order:	federal-
ism,	democracy,	constitutionalism	and	the	rule	of	law,	and	respect	for	minorities.	These	
principles	do	not,	said	the	Court,	stand	alone;	rather,	they	are	highly	interrelated	and	perme-
ate	every	part	of	the	Canadian	order.	They	act	as	organizing	principles	of	the	state	as	well	
as	aspirational	ideals	that	the	Canadian	polity	has	sought,	and	continues	to	pursue	and	make	
real.
In	its	analysis	of	the	constitutional	requirements	for	secession,	the	Supreme	Court	con-
sidered	the	written	constitution,	unwritten	norms,	and	the	global	system	of	rules	and	prin-
ciples—in	sum,	the	“vital	unstated	assumptions”	that	govern	the	exercise	of	constitutional	
authority.	These	four	underlying	principles,	the	judges	said,	are	the	“lifeblood”	of	the	con-
stitution	and	 therefore	mutually	support	every	part	of	 the	Canadian	state.53	They	do	not	
function	as	trumps	over	one	another.	In	addition	to	their	highly	persuasive	interpretive	im-
port,	these	principles	can	have	“full legal force”	in	certain	circumstances.54	This	means	that	
they	are	binding	upon	courts,	can	give	rise	to	substantive	legal	obligations	(both	general	
and	specific),	and	may	function	as	real	constraints	on	government	action.55	It	would	be	im-
possible,	the	Court	averred,	to	understand	the	Canadian	constitutional	order	without	these	
architectonic	and	organic	principles.
In	the	context	of	a	threat	of	unilateral	secession	by	the	province	of	Quebec,	the	Court	
wrote	that	the	four	fundamental	principles	mandate	a	rejection	of	unilateralism	and	a	need	
for	principled	negotiation	as	the	default	position	in	the	Canadian	legal	and	political	order.56	
On	this	understanding,	sovereign	power	in	a	Westminster-style	democracy	also	cannot	be	
understood	as	an	unrestrained	will	acting	unilaterally.	Rather,	a	democratic	rule	of	law	re-
quires	that	sovereign	power	be	lawful,	responsive,	and	moderate	in	its	actions.	Along	with	
the	principle	of	democracy,	the	other	three	unwritten	principles	will	also	distinctively	shape	
and	constrain	the	exercise	of	sovereign	authority.	This	conception	of	sovereign	power,	for	
example,	 ideally	constrains	 the	 federal	 sovereign	 from	dominating	provincial	 sovereigns	
within	federalism.	It	also	constrains	majorities	from	oppressing	or	discriminating	against	
minorities	within	a	democratic	regime.	The	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	within	institutional	
dialogue	guarantees	the	existence	of	formal	conduits	and	processes	for	dialogue	to	occur,	
and	obliges	institutions	comprising	the	legal	and	political	system	to	engage	in	moderate	
politics	in	order	to	realize	these	substantive	constitutional	commitments.	The	Court	under-
scores	this	point	in	the	Secession Reference	when	it	declares	that	democracy	cannot	exist	
without	the	rule	of	law:
53	 Secession Reference, supra	note	45	at	paras.	50-51.
54	 Ibid.	at	paras.	51-54	(emphasis	added).
55	 Ibid.	at	para.	54.
56	 Ibid.	at	paras.	84,	97.
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To	be	accorded	legitimacy,	democratic	institutions	must	rest,	ultimately,	on	a	legal	foundation.	
That	 is,	 they	must	allow	for	 the	participation	of,	and	accountability	to,	 the	people,	 through	
public	institutions	created	under	the	Constitution.	Equally,	however,	a	system	of	government	
cannot	survive	through	adherence	to	law	alone.	A	political	system	must	also	possess	legitima-
cy,	and	in	our	political	culture,	that	requires	an	interaction	between	the	rule	of	law	and	the	
democratic	principle.	…	Our	law’s	claim	to	legitimacy	also	rests	on	an	appeal	to	moral	values,	
many	of	which	are	embedded	in	our	constitutional	structure.	It	would	be	a	grave	mistake	to	
equate	legitimacy	with	the	“sovereign	will”	or	majority	rule	alone,	to	the	exclusion	of	other	
constitutional	values.57
The	unwritten	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	therefore	constrains	the	principle	of	parliamentary	
sovereignty	from	its	tendency	to	define	democracy	merely	as	a	set	of	formal	institutional	
arrangements.	But	it	also	constrains	courts	from	unilaterally,	arbitrarily,	and	anti-democratically	
substituting	their	views	for	Parliament’s	in	constitutional	matters.
c.  the new Minimalist rule of law
Perhaps	not	surprisingly,	Supreme	Court	judges	also	disagree	about	the	scope	and	content	of	
the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law.	In	a	trilogy	of	recent	cases—Imperial Tobacco,58	Charkaoui,	
59	and	Christie60—the	Supreme	Court	has	considerably	narrowed	the	scope	and	effect	of	
this	principle	within	Canadian	law.	In	Canada’s	constitutional	house,	the	current	decor	is	
sleek	and	spare.
The	Supreme	Court	continues	to	affirm	the	unwritten	constitutional	principle	of	the	rule	
of	law	by	asserting	its	status	as	a	foundational	principle	at	the	root	of	our	system	of	gover-
nance,	implicit	in	the	very	concept	of	a	constitution.	According	to	the	Court,	the	rule	of	law	
incorporates	a	number	of	familiar	themes	and	embraces	at	least	four	principles:	(1)	it	is	su-
preme	over	private	individuals	as	well	as	over	government	officials,	who	are	required	to	
exercise	their	authority	non-arbitrarily	and	according	to	law;	(2)	it	requires	the	creation	and	
maintenance	of	a	positive	order	of	laws;	(3)	it	requires	the	relationship	between	the	state	
and	the	individual	to	be	regulated	by	law;	and	(4)	it	is	linked	to	the	principle	of	judicial	in-
dependence.61	These	four	subsidiary	attributes	clearly	conform	to	the	general	discussion	of	
the	rule	of	law	presented	in	part	II,	“The	Rule	of	Law	in	Theory,”	above.
Although	the	rule	of	law	may	possess	additional	principles,	there	is,	however,	one	key	
attribute	that	the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	does	not	possess:	the	ability	to	strike	down	
legislation	based	on	its	content.62	The	rule	of	law,	then,	does	not	speak	“directly”	to	the	
terms	of	legislation	(or	provisions	of	statutes).	This	does	not	mean	that	the	rule	of	law	has	
no	normative	force	at	all,	says	the	Court,	but	simply	that	the	government	action	it	is	able	to	
57	 Ibid.	at	paras.	67,	68.
58	 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,	[2005]	2	S.C.R.	473	[Imperial Tobacco].
59	 Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),	2007	SCC	9	[Charkaoui].
60	 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie,	2007	SCC	21	[Christie].
61	 Imperial Tobacco, supra	note	58	at	para.	58;	Charkaoui, supra	note	59	at	para.	134;	Christie, supra	note	60	
at	para.	20.
62	 Imperial Tobacco,	supra	note	58	at	para.	59.
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constrain	 is	 usually	 that	 of	 the	 executive	 and	 administrative	 branches.	 Legislatures	 are	
constrained	by	“manner	and	form”	requirements	in	the	processes	of	enacting,	amending,	or	
repealing	legislation.63	This	is	because	the	principles	of	democracy,	constitutionalism,	and	
judicial	independence	favour	the	validity	of	legislation	that	conforms	to	the	express	terms	
of	the	constitution,	or	those	that	follow	as	necessary	implications	from	the	express	terms.64	
Nevertheless,	the	normative	force	of	the	rule	of	law	on	this	understanding	does	appear	to	
have	been	significantly	curtailed65	and	the	Court	has	minimized	reference	to	substantive	
rule-of-law	values.
The	Charkaoui	decision	declared	unconstitutional	the	detention	review	hearings	process	
set	out	in	the	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act	(IRPA).	The	Court	held	that	the	stat-
utory	scheme	violated	s.	7	principles	of	fundamental	justice,	ss.	9	and	10	guarantees	against	
arbitrary	detention,	and	 the	protection	against	cruel	and	unusual	 treatment	 in	s.	12.	The	
Court,	however,	could	not	actually	review	the	reasonableness	of	security	certificates	(cer-
tificates	issued	jointly	by	the	Ministers	of	Public	Security	and	Immigration)	because	they	
are	not	subject	to	review	or	appeal.	The	Court	also	addressed	arguments	relating	to	the	rule	
of	law,	and	s.	15	of	the	Charter	as	it	applies	to	foreign	nationals,	but	did	not	consider	these	
arguments	relevant	for	the	decision.	The	Court	held	that	the	use	of	secret	evidence	and	the	
likelihood	of	indefinite	detention	without	meaningful	and	timely	review	for	non-citizens	
clearly	violated	due	process	rights.	To	guarantee	a	fair	hearing	under	the	Charter,	a	different	
procedure	should	be	created—one	that	does	not	so	greatly	infringe	Charter	rights.	But	the	
rule	of	law	did	not	support	a	right	to	appeal	from	the	Federal	Court	judge’s	determination	
of	the	reasonableness	of	the	certificate,	nor	could	it	prohibit	automatic	detention	or	deten-
tion	on	the	basis	of	executive	or	ministerial	decision-making.66	While	the	Charkaoui	deci-
sion	should	be	celebrated	for	upholding	s.	7’s	requirement	of	a	fair	procedure	for	determin-
ing	an	issue	of	vital	importance	to	a	detainee,	the	Court’s	reliance	on	a	formal	conception	
of	the	rule	of	law	comes	at	a	cost:	it	inhibits	the	purchase	of	rule-of-law	values	implicit	in	
the	unwritten	or	common-law	constitution.	Consideration	of	substantive	rule-of-law	values,	
like	those	found	in	the	Roncarelli	decision,	would	provide	a	toehold	for	judicial	scrutiny	of	
the	failure	to	provide	a	right	of	appeal	from	the	reasonableness	of	a	security	certificate,	as	
well	as	the	power	of	detention	given	to	executive	actors	under	IRPA.
63	 But	see	Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General),	[2003]	2	S.C.R.	40,	both	for	troubling	insights	into	how	
an	executive-controlled	government	can	manipulate	and	avoid	the	manner	and	form	requirements	of	enact-
ing	legislation,	and	for	a	tragic	example	of	a	systemic	failure	of	accountability.
64	 Imperial Tobacco, supra	note	58	at	para.	66.
65	 This	is	clear	in	the	Charkaoui	decision	where	express	provisions	of	the	Charter were	used	to	strike	down	
the	security	certificate	process	under	the	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act	(IRPA),	but	the	rule	of	law	
argument	against	the	certificate	provisions	in	the	IRPA	was	relegated	to	the	margins.	Craig	Forcese,	in	chap-
ter	11,	discusses	the	truncated	reach	of	the	Charkaoui	decision,	which	will	be	of	little	assistance	in	adminis-
trative	proceedings	where	s.	7	of	the	Charter	is	not	triggered.	As	he	and	other	commentators	emphasize,	in	a	
state	built	on	the	rule	of	law,	no	public	power	should	lie	beyond	the	reach	of	law.	If	judicial	review	of	cases	con-
cerning	national	security	is	too	deferential,	alternative	institutional	forms	of	accountability	must	be	devised.
66	 The	Court	noted	that	the	Federal	Court	is	a	superior	court,	not	an	administrative	tribunal—such	a	right	could	
be	said	to	flow	from	a	decision	made	in	the	administrative	context.	The	legality	of	the	process,	according	to	
the	Court,	 is	 nevertheless	 reinforced	because	 the	Federal	Court	 of	Appeal	 can	 circumvent	 the	 privative	
clause	where	the	constitutionality	of	the	legislation	is	challenged	or	where	the	individual	alleges	bias	on	the	
part	of	the	judge.	Charkaoui, supra	note	59	at	paras.	136,	137.
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The	Christie	case	involved	a	constitutional	challenge	brought	by	Dugald	Christie,	a	liti-
gation	lawyer,	who	claimed	that	British	Columbia’s	7	percent	legal	service	tax	made	it	im-
possible	for	some	of	his	low-income	clients	to	retain	him	to	pursue	their	claims.	The	Court	
affirmed	that	one	purpose	of	the	rule	of	law	is	to	ensure	access	to	justice—an	issue	that	is	
the	focus	of	chapter	15	by	Lorne	Sossin.	The	Court	noted	that,	when	rights	and	obligations	
are	at	stake,	individual	access	to	justice	can	often	only	happen	through	lawyers	whose	role	
is	to	bring	citizens’	complaints	about	unlawful	or	abusive	private	or	state	action	to	courts	
or	administrative	tribunals.	As	a	component	of	the	rule	of	law,	access	to	justice	may	guar-
antee	a	right	to	legal	services,	such	as	a	right	to	counsel	in	some	circumstances	(particularly	
in	the	criminal	context).	But	the	rule	of	law	does	not	underwrite	a	general	right	to	legal	ser-
vices,	to	legal	assistance,	or	to	counsel	in	relation	to	court	and	tribunal	proceedings.67	It	
therefore	also	cannot	constitutionalize	a	particular	type	of	access	to	justice,	such	as	a	spe-
cific	institutional	form	of	legal	aid.	Although	the	argument	against	the	use	of	the	rule	of	law	
in	this	case	does	not	foreclose	the	possibility	that	a	right	to	counsel	may	be	found	in	other	
circumstances,	a	general	right	to	counsel	could	not	be	found.	Because	sufficient	evidence	
did	not	exist	to	prove	that	low-income	persons	were	prevented	from	accessing	legal	servic-
es,	the	provincial	tax	paid	by	all	users	of	legal	services,	regardless	of	their	income	status,	
was	found	constitutional.	The	Court,	however,	suggested	that	an	adequate	evidentiary	re-
cord	in	a	different	case	might	provide	grounds	for	judicial	gap-filling	by	finding	a	constitu-
tional	entitlement	to	legal	services	in	relation	to	proceedings	in	courts	and	tribunals	dealing	
with	rights	and	obligations.	Once	again,	the	Court	emphasized	that	the	principle	of	the	rule	
of	law	could	not	be	used	to	strike	down	otherwise	valid	legislation.68
As	Lorne	Sossin	discusses	in	chapter	15,	the	relationship	between	the	unwritten	princi-
ples	of	the	rule	of	law	and	“access	to	justice”	remains	underspecified	in	Canadian	law,	al-
though	his	chapter	concretizes	several	factors	that	inform	the	quality	of	access	to	justice.	
The	tensions	among	the	rule	of	law,	fairness,	equality,	and	efficiency	remain	particularly	
acute	in	administrative	law	because	many	tribunals	were	established	to	provide	access	for	
low-income	or	otherwise	vulnerable	individuals;	however,	these	tribunals	may	fail	to	do	so	
and,	for	reasons	concerning	the	separation	of	powers,	recourse	to	the	courts	may	not	pro-
vide	a	remedy.	Recalling	the	concepts	of	the	rule	of	law	advanced	by	the	three	theorists	in	
part	 II,	 above,	 all	 suggested	 some	 degree	 of	 access	 to	 the	 legal	 system.69	 Each	 theory	
67	 Christie, supra	note	60	at	paras.	23-27.
68	 The	lack	of	congruence	between	the	stated	purpose	of	the	tax	and	its	actual	effect	in	this	case	is	troubling,	
though.	The	stated	purpose	of	the	tax	was	to	fund	legal	aid	in	British	Columbia,	but	instead	the	money	went	
into	general	revenue.	The	Court	could	not	determine	how	much—if	any—of	the	tax	actually	went	to	fund	
legal	aid.	
69	 Access	to	justice	appears	in	Dicey’s	conception	of	the	rule	of	law	by	necessity	in	his	common-law	model,	
in	Fuller’s	procedural	understanding	of	the	rule	of	law,	and	explicitly	as	one	of	Raz’s	principles.	Yet	none	of	
these	theories	dictates	a	particular	institutional	arrangement	facilitating	or	guaranteeing	access	to	justice.	
Dicey’s	theory	relies	on	a	common-law	constitutionalism	driven	by	private	law	rights	of	property	and	con-
tract,	not	one	oriented	toward	democratic	access	by	all,	including	the	disadvantaged.	Raz’s	functionalist	ac-
count	 suggests	 that	 courts	 should	 be	 easily	 accessible—but	 he	 does	 not	 specify	 whether	 this	 relative	
openness	is	constrained	by	justiciability	or	fiscal	limits.	Because	Raz	relies	on	a	formal	view	of	legal	equali-
ty	within	the	rule	of	law,	access	to	justice	cannot	be	equated	with	equal	access	to	legal	services	by	all	as	a	
democratic	right.	Fuller’s	aspirational	theory	is	consistent	with	the	common-law	openness	of	Dicey’s	and	
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	therefore	comports	with	the	fundamental	conviction	that	individuals	should	have	access	
to	due	process	when	their	rights	and	interests	have	been	affected	by	government	action.	
Each	also	supports	some	measure	of	access	within	a	rule	of	law	state,	but	again	none	ex-
plicitly	argues	for	effective	equal	access	for	all	legal	subjects.70	Indeed,	of	all	the	theorists	
considered	in	this	chapter,	only	Ronald	Dworkin	explicitly	considers	access	to	be	a	matter	
of	fairness	that	benefits	the	least	well	off	and	satisfies	the	demands	of	legal	equality	in	the	
rule	of	law.
Clearly,	the	Court	has	become	anxious	about	the	risks	of	its	own	forms	of	arbitrariness	
through	 recourse	 to	unwritten	principles	and	 is	attempting	 to	constrain	 the	use	of	 these	
principles	by	judges	and	litigants.	Because	unwritten	principles	do	not	have	content	fixed	
in	advance,	they	appear	transcendent,	and	their	articulation	and	use	look	like	an	unconstrained	
form	of	judicial	law-making.	Fears	about	undemocratic	judicial	activism	arise	because	it	
could	appear	that	the	judiciary	is	usurping	the	legislative	role	by	engaging	in	subjective	and	
arbitrary	decision-making.	Unwritten	principles	therefore	challenge	the	idea	of	a	bright-line	
conception	of	 the	separation	of	powers.71	This	has	 led	 the	Court	 to	move	 to	what	Peter	
Hogg	and	Cara	Zwibel	define	as	the	“middle”	ground	that,	for	them,	is	occupied	by	thinkers	
like	themselves	and	Raz,	where	unwritten	principles	like	the	rule	of	law	have	no	direct	le-
gal	effect,	but	are	merely	influential	“constitutional	values.”72
the	institutional	openness	of	Raz’s.	But	it	is	not	clear	whether	or	not	his	theory	would	underwrite	greater	
	access	to	justice	because	citizens	play	a	role	in	the	maintenance	of	the	legal	system	through	litigation.	Given	
the	 polycentric	 nature	 of	 public	 law	 cases,	 Fuller’s	 theory	 could	 also	 support	more	 limited	 grounds	 of	
justiciability.
70	 The	procedural	devices	available	to	judges	by	virtue	of	the	rule	of	law—procedural	due	process	(rights	to	
representation,	cross-examine	witnesses,	etc.),	habeas	corpus,	the	right	to	appeal	an	adverse	decision,	stand-
ing	to	raise	constitutional	issues—ensure	that	judges	play	a	large	role	in	Fuller’s	theory.	Nevertheless,	litiga-
tion	alone	 is	 an	unsatisfactory	method	of	 ensuring	access	 to	 justice	because	“haphazard	and	fluctuating	
principles	concerning	this	matter	[standing]	can	produce	a	broken	and	arbitrary	pattern	of	correspondence	
between	 the	Constitution	and	 its	 realization	 in	practice.”	Serious	disadvantages	of	 relying	 solely	on	 the	
courts	as	a	bulwark	against	the	“lawless	administration	of	the	law”	include	the	willingness	and	financial	
ability	of	the	affected	party	to	litigate,	the	inability	of	the	courts	to	properly	constrain	police	lawlessness,	
and	the	ability	of	courts	to	make	things	much	worse	by	departing	from	principles,	not	articulating	reasonably	
clear	general	rules,	issuing	contradictory	rulings,	changing	direction	frequently	or	suddenly,	and	aggravating	
the	already	vexed	problem	of	interpretation.	Fuller,	supra	note	10	at	81-82.
71	 In	an	important	article,	David	Dyzenhaus	illustrates	how	the	Supreme	Court’s	use	of	unwritten	principles	in	
administrative	law	cases	is	incompatible	with	their	prior	reliance	on	a	formal	conception	of	the	doctrine	of	
the	separation	of	powers.	Instead	of	a	formal	understanding,	which	he	views	as	inherently	unstable,	Dyzen-
haus	underscores	the	significance	of	judgments	like	Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion),	 [1999]	 2	 S.C.R.	 817	 [Baker]	 and	 Cooper,	 supra	 note	 24,	 that	 express	 a	 vision	 of	 democratic	
constitutionalism	which	respects	the	legitimacy	of	the	administrative	state.	This	vision	of	Canadian	consti-
tutionalism	relies	on	a	democratic	interpretation	of	the	separation	of	powers	and	therefore	recognizes	the	
appropriate	role	of	administrative	tribunals—particularly	human	rights	tribunals—in	determining	fundamen-
tal	 legal	values.	See	 in	particular	section	 I,	“The	Separation	of	Powers	and	 the	Administrative	State”	 in	
“Constituting	the	Rule	of	Law:	Fundamental	Values	in	Administrative	Law”	(2002)	27	Queen’s	L.J.	445	at	
453-87	[“Constituting	Fundamental	Values”].
72	 Peter	W.	Hogg	&	Cara	F.	Zwibel,	“The	Rule	of	Law	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada”	(2005)	53	U.T.L.J.	716	
at	718.	Like	Raz,	they	suggest	that	the	claim	that	the	rule	of	law	requires	our	laws	to	“respect	equality,	human	
dignity,	and	other	good	moral	values	is	really	just	natural	law	in	disguise.	The	rule	of	law	is	not	a	protection	
against	laws	that	are	bad.”	Remedies	for	bad	laws	are	to	be	found	in	the	written	constitution	and	democratic	
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Fears	of	arbitrariness	are	also	related	to	the	contested	status	of	the	rule	of	law.	The	Court	took	
its	clearest	stance	concerning	the	power	of	and	limits	on	the	unwritten	principle	of	the	rule	of	
law	in	Imperial Tobacco.	Imperial Tobacco	concerned	a	statute	enacted	by	the	province	of	Brit-
ish	Columbia,	the	Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act,	which	allowed	the	
province	to	sue	manufacturers	of	tobacco	products	for	compensation	of	tobacco-related	health	
care	costs	incurred	by	individuals	exposed	to	tobacco	products.73	The	provincial	government	
argued	that	tobacco	companies	were	liable	for	these	health	care	costs	because	they	breached	a	
duty	of	care	to	persons	in	British	Columbia	by	producing	products	that	could	reasonably	be	ex-
pected	to	cause	harm.	One	effect	of	the	Act	was	to	permit	not	only	the	recovery	of	current	and	
future	costs,	but	also	to	recover	costs	retroactively	from	the	past	50	years.	The	tobacco	compa-
nies	challenged	the	validity	of	the	statute	on	three	constitutional	grounds:	extra-territoriality,	
	judicial	independence,	and	the	rule	of	law.	Major	J.,	writing	for	the	Court	in	Imperial Tobacco,	
focused	on	the	debates	concerning	the	meaning	of	the	rule	of	law	and	what	principles	it	might	
incorporate,	noting	with	approval	Strayer	J.A.’s	dictum	in	Singh v. Canada (Attorney Gener-
al),74	that:	“[a]dvocates	tend	to	read	into	the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	anything	which	supports	
their	particular	view	of	what	the	law	should	be.”75	The	Court	affirmed	that	the	rule	of	law	does	
not	require	that	legislation	be	prospective	(except	in	criminal	law)	or	general.	It	also	does	not	
prohibit	 the	 conferral	 of	 special	 privileges	 on	 the	 government,	 except	where	 necessary	 for	
	effective	governance.76	Lastly,	it	does	not	ensure	a	fair	civil	trial.77	The	Court	claimed	that	to	
	affirm	these	features	constitutionally,	as	the	tobacco	companies	had	argued,	would	be	tanta-
mount	to	endorsing	one	particular	conception	of	the	rule	of	law,	thereby	seriously	undermining	
the	legitimacy	of	judicial	review.	The	written	constitution	has	primacy,	such	that	the	attributes	
of	the	rule	of	law	are	simply	broader	versions	of	the	rights	already	contained	in	the	Charter.78	
Protection	 from	unjust	or	unfair	 legislation	“properly	 lies	not	 in	 the	amorphous	underlying	
principles	of	our	Constitution,	but	in	its	text	and	the	ballot	box.”79	When	legislatures	use	their	
powers	validly	but	arbitrarily,	and	the	content	of	such	legislation	does	not	engage	an	express	
constitutional	provision,	then	citizens	must	look	to	internal	forms	of	government	responsibility	
and	the	democratic	process	of	elections	for	accountability	and	correction,	not	to	the	courts.80
institutions.	Ibid.	For	a	sophisticated,	contrary	argument,	see	Mark	D.	Walters,	“‘Common	Public	Law	in	the	
Age	of	Legislation’:	David	Mullan	and	the	Unwritten	Constitution”	in	Grant	Huscroft	&	Michael	Taggart,	
eds., Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2006)	at	421.
73	 Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act,	S.B.C.	2000,	c.	30.
74	 [2000]	3	F.C.	185	(C.A.).
75	 Imperial Tobacco,	supra	note	58	at	para.	33.
76	 The	statute	also	changed	rules	of	civil	procedure	in	order	to	counter	the	systemic	advantages	that	tobacco	
manufacturers	enjoy	in	private	law	litigation	by	shifting	the	onus	of	proof	from	the	government	to	the	to-
bacco	manufacturers.	Tobacco	companies	had	to	prove,	on	a	balance	of	probabilities,	that	their	products	did	
not	and	do	not	cause	harm	to	affected	persons	in	British	Columbia.	The	tobacco	companies	argued	that	the	
shift	of	the	evidentiary	burden	interfered	both	with	the	guarantee	of	a	fair	trial	and	the	ability	of	judges	to	
assess	and	weigh	the	relevant	evidence.
77	 Imperial Tobacco,	supra	note	58	at	para.	63.
78	 Ibid. at	para.	65.
79	 Ibid. at	para.	66.	
80	 See	Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp.	(1999),	180	Sask.	R.	20	at	paras.	30,	36	(C.A.).
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d.  lower court unruliness?
Though	the	Court	has	not	completely	shut	down	the	legal	and	normative	force	of	the	un-
written	principle	of	the	rule	of	law,	it	has	signalled	a	marked	unwillingness	to	engage	in	any	
such	“gap-filling”	through	the	use	of	unwritten	principles.81	Such	a	conclusion	cuts	against	
the	grain	of	the	earlier	jurisprudence	concerning	unwritten	constitutional	principles.	Those	
who	wish	 to	 see	 robust	 use	 of	 unwritten	 principles	must	 look	 to	 lower	 court	 decisions	
where	the	unwritten	principle	of	the	rule	of	law,	in	conjunction	with	other	unwritten	princi-
ples,	has	supplemented	the	written	constitutional	text	and	provided	grounds	for	invalidating	
legislation	based	on	its	content.82
Unwritten	principles	have	also	provided	the	justification	for	judicial	intervention	in	dis-
cretionary	decision-making.	In	Lalonde,	for	example,	the	Ontario	Court	of	Appeal83	reviewed	
a	discretionary	decision	made	by	the	Health	Services	Restructuring	Commission	to	close	the	
sole	francophone	hospital	in	Ontario,	a	decision	allegedly	made	in	the	public	interest.	The	stat-
ute	stipulated	that	a	right	to	receive	French	language	services	could	only	be	limited	if	all	
reasonable	and	necessary	measures	to	comply	with	the	statute	had	been	exhausted.84	Mont-
fort	was	explicitly	designated	as	a	francophone	hospital	for	the	Ottawa-Carleton	community	
and	the	decision	to	restructure	it	was	a	shift	in	policy	for	which	no	explanation	was	given.	
While	the	Commission	could	exercise	discretion	to	change	and	even	limit	the	provision	of	
these	 services,	 “it	 cannot	 simply	 invoke	 administrative	 convenience	 and	 vague	 funding	
	concerns	 as	 the	 reasons	 for	 doing	 so.”85	The	Health	 Services	Commission	 forfeited	 its	
entitlement	to	deference	by	providing	no	justificatory	policy	for	impinging	on	fundamental	
constitutional	values.	Because	the	Commission	failed	to	give	serious	weight	to	the	linguis-
tic	and	cultural	significance	of	the	Montfort	Hospital	to	the	Franco-Ontarian	minority,	it	
acted	in	a	contrary	manner	to	the	normative	and	legal	import	of	the	unwritten	constitutional	
principle	of	respect	for	and	protection	of	minorities;	the	decision	was	therefore	quashed.
81	 This	seems	to	be	the	conclusion	despite	some	tension	with	McLachlin	C.J.’s	public	remarks:	“I	will	suggest	
that	actually	quite	a	lot	is	going	on,	and	that	it	is	important.	What	is	going	on	is	the	idea	that	there	exist	fun-
damental	norms	of	justice	so	basic	that	they	form	part	of	the	legal	structure	of	governance	and	must	be	up-
held	by	the	courts,	whether	or	not	they	find	expression	in	constitutional	texts.	And	the	idea	is	important,	
going	to	the	core	of	just	governance	and	how	we	define	the	respective	roles	of	Parliament,	the	executive	and	
the	judiciary.”	“Remarks	of	the	Right	Honourable	Beverley	McLachlin,	P.C.,”	given	at	the	2005	Lord	Cooke	
Lecture	 in	Wellington,	 New	Zealand,	December	 1,	 2005,	 online:	 <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/	
judges/speeches/UnwrittenPrinciples_e.asp>.	
82	 See,	for	example,	the	discussion	by	the	majority	in	the	Court	of	Appeal	of	British	Columbia	of	the	principle	
of	the	rule	of	law	in	relation	to	the	principle	of	access	to	justice.	Christie v. British Columbia,	2005	BCCA	
63.	The	Supreme	Court	rejected	this	line	of	argument	in	its	decision	discussed	above.
83	 Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé),	2001	CanLII	21164	(Ont.	C.A.)	
[Lalonde].	In	chapter	7,	Evan	Fox-Decent	discusses	unwritten	principles	in	the	relationship	of	procedural	
fairness	to	legislation.	He	notes	that	judges	have	imposed	duties	to	give	reasons	where	an	unwritten	consti-
tutional	principle	was	at	stake	and	the	relevant	legislation	was	silent	on	the	issue. In	Lalonde,	for	example,	
the	principle	of	the	protection	of	minorities	led	to	the	imposition	of	a	duty	to	give	reasons. 
84	 The	normative	force	of	unwritten	constitutional	principles	therefore	animated	a	large	and	liberal	interpreta-
tion	of	the	relevant	provincial	statute,	the	French Language Services Act,	R.S.O.	1990,	c.	F.32,	and	motivat-
ed	the	Court’s	less	deferential	attitude	toward	the	Commission’s	decision.
85	 Lalonde, supra	note	83	at	para.	168.
IV.	 Administering	the	Rule	of	Law	 99
As	a	public	law	decision,	Lalonde	coheres	with	the	lineage	of	Roncarelli.	These	deci-
sions	illustrate	how	judges	can	craft	a	decision	that	is	grounded	in	the	written	constitution,	
but	also	further	a	distinctive	Canadian	political	morality	using	principles	of	justice	drawn	
from	administrative	and	constitutional	law.	Approaching	language	rights	purposively,	 the	
Ontario	court	identified	several	underlying	constitutional	principles	which	it	used	to	inter-
pret	the	boundaries	within	which	the	Ontario	government	could	act.	The	Ontario	Court	of	Ap-
peal	held	that	a	fundamental	unwritten	principle	of	the	constitutional	order,	protection	of	mi-
norities,	 served	 to	 protect	Ontario’s	 sole	 francophone	 hospital	 from	both	 closure	 and	 a	
substantial	reduction	in	services.	The	Commission’s	directions	were	quashed	because	they	
failed	to	take	into	account	the	importance	of	francophone	institutions	and	the	preservation	
of	Franco-Ontarian	culture.	In	this	case,	the	Court	of	Appeal	relied	on	the	Supreme	Court	
of	Canada’s	decision	in	Baker 86	to	conclude	that	“the	review	of	discretionary	decisions	on	
the	basis	of	fundamental	Canadian	constitutional	and	societal	values”87	is	possible	and,	de-
spite	being	accorded	a	large	degree	of	deference,	such	discretionary	decisions	are	not	im-
mune	from	judicial	scrutiny.
IV.  adMInISterIng the rule of law
a.  a complex Institutional relationship
All	of	the	authors	in	this	text	allude	to	the	lengthy	and	complex	history	in	relations	among	
the	administrative	state,	democracy,	and	the	rule	of	law.	As	discussed	earlier,	at	the	begin-
ning	of	the	20th	century	the	emerging	administrative	state	was	often	seen	as	a	threat	both	
to	parliamentary	sovereignty	and	to	the	rule	of	law	because	delegated	powers	from	the	po-
litical	executive	operated	outside	legislative	scrutiny.	Not	only	did	these	new	administrative	
bodies	possess	substantial	powers	to	restrict	freedom,	redistribute	property,	and	make	deci-
sions	on	matters	relating	to	individual	rights,	but	they	also	handled	many	more	cases	than	
courts	did.	Governments—and	the	executive	in	particular—could	control	these	new	bodies	
through	the	appointments	process	and	had	significant	influence	over	delegated	policy	areas.	
The	growth	of	regulatory	law	also	meant	an	expanded	scope	of	discretion	for	government	
officials	in	interpreting	standards	and	defining	goals	in	various	statutory	schemes	and	ex-
ecutive	regulations.	This	development	was	extremely	worrisome	for	those	concerned	with	
accountability,	because	Parliament,	the	responsible	minister,	and	the	courts	together	could	
not	provide	full	oversight,	given	their	lack	of	specialized	policy	knowledge	and	the	sheer	
quantity	of	cases	that	the	administrative	state	generated.
As	a	result	of	the	expansion	of	the	administrative	state,	and	well	before	the	Charter,	ad-
ministrative	law	had	to	struggle	to	construct	a	relationship	with	the	modern	state	that	re-
spected	 the	 expertise	 and	 policy	 choices	 of	 various	 administrative	 agencies	 and	 boards	
while	 simultaneously	 recognizing	 the	 legitimacy	and	effectiveness	of	parallel	bodies	of	
justice	such	as	administrative	tribunals.	Administrative	law	therefore	served	a	crucial	func-
tion	by	establishing,	over	time,	a	relationship	between	courts	and	government	departments	
as	 one	 requiring	 reciprocal	 legal	 and	 political	 recognition.	 Because	 so	 many	 of	 these	
86	 Baker,	supra	note	71.
87	 Ibid.	at	para.	177.
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	administrative	bodies—labour	and	marketing	boards,	for	example—were	created	to	respond	
to	political	pressures	and	regulatory	problems,	courts,	through	administrative	law,	had	to	
rethink	their	posture	in	relation	to	them	in	the	postwar	era.	This	posture	was	usually	character-
ized	by	the	term	“deference.”	More	important,	the	courts’	view	of	the	state	had	to	change	as	
well.	The	older	and	classical	liberal	view	of	the	minimal	state	no	longer	matched	reality,	
and	courts	had	to	change	their	institutional	practices	to	acknowledge	the	legitimacy	of	the	
	welfare	 state.	 Finally,	 administrative	 law	 served	 as	 an	 important	 pre-Charter	 vehicle	 to	
challenge	government	policy	and	to	secure	rule	of	law	restraints	on	discretionary	decision-
	making	in	social	and	economic	policy,	a	role	that	contained	both	positive	and	negative	fea-
tures,	depending	on	one’s	political	perspective	and	the	particular	issue	at	play.
B.   the rule of law and Post-charter administrative law:  
deference as respect
While	the	rule	of	law	traditionally	serves	as	a	bulwark	against	the	executive	branch	of	gov-
ernment	and	supports	judicial	oversight	of	broad	statutory	grants	of	discretion,	this	role	be-
comes	more	complicated	in	the	modern	administrative	state.	With	legislatively	delegated	
powers	to	different	kinds	of	administrative	bodies,	the	role	of	courts	can	be	understood	in	
two	contrasting	ways.	On	the	one	hand,	courts	provide	an	essential	accountability	function	
by	policing	the	exercise	of	delegated	discretionary	powers	to	ensure	that	they	are	confined	
to	terms	and	purposes	specified	by	the	authorizing	statute.	On	the	other	hand,	courts	are	
conscious	of	the	separation	of	powers	and,	given	their	lack	of	expertise	in	determining	the	
merits	of	certain	policy-making	exercises,	are	themselves	under	rule	of	law	constraints	to	
respect	legislative	and	executive	branches.	The	history	of	the	relations	between	the	courts	
and	the	other	branches	of	government	in	administrative	law	began	as	a	bipolar	relationship:	
courts	showed	greater	deference	to	executive	decision-making	and	prerogative	powers,	as	
well	as	to	legislation,	but	were	highly	antagonistic	toward	decisions	made	by	actual	admin-
istrative	bodies,	bodies	 that	were	not	 seen	as	credible	or	competent	decision-makers	on	
questions	of	law.	The	relationship	of	courts	to	other	branches	now	aspires	to	a	kind	of	re-
spectful	deference88	(where	merited)	characterized	by	an	institutional	dialogue	about	the	
appropriate	use	and	control	of	discretion,	rather	than	the	older	command-and-control	rela-
tionship.89	Despite	this	new	normative	underpinning,	the	relationship	among	administrative	
bodies	and	courts	encounters	recurring	problems	arising	from	privative	clauses,	unwritten	
88	 Dyzenhaus,	“Constituting	Fundamental	Values,” supra	note	71	at	489-502.	See	also	David	Dyzenhaus,	“The	
Politics	of	Deference:	Judicial	Review	and	Democracy”	in	Michael	Taggart,	ed.,	The Province of Adminis-
trative Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1997)	where	the	original	phrase	occurs	at	286.	Dyzenhaus	
contrasts	the	principle	of	“deference	as	respect”	to	the	traditional	principle	of	judicial	deference.	He	labels	
the	traditional	approach	a	Diceyan	“deference	as	submission”	where	judges	must	submit	to	the	intention	of	
the	legislature	because	of	the	overriding	principle	of	parliamentary	sovereignty.	Deference	as	respect	is	the	
opposite	of	deference	as	submission.	It	should	also	be	distinguished	from	the	Dworkinian	model,	which	
places	judges	at	the	apex	of	the	legal	order	and	whose	role	is	to	enforce	individualistic	common-law	values	
against	the	state.
89	 See	Geneviève	Cartier’s	conception	of	discretion	as	dialogue	versus	discretion	as	power	in	chapter	10.	See	
also	Bill	Bogart’s	analysis	of	“new	governance”	in	chapter	2,	in	which	negotiation,	persuasion,	and	enabling	
skills	have	displaced	command	and	control	as	a	mode	of	regulation	and	public	management.
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principles,	ministerial	discretion	in	the	national	security	context,	statutory	interpretation,	
and	the	choice	of	standard	of	review.
c.  an example of deference as respect: national corn growers
Contrasting	approaches	to	the	intensity	of	judicial	scrutiny	of	agency	decisions	inform	the	
substance	of	the	differing	opinions	written	by	Gonthier	J.	and	Wilson	J.	in	National Corn 
Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal).90	The	Canadian	Import	Tribunal	conducted	an	
inquiry	into	the	importation	of	corn	grain	from	the	United	States	into	Canada,	an	inquiry	
authorized	under	s.	42	of	the	Special Import Measures Act	(SIMA),91	and	determined	that	
continued	importation	of	grain	had	already	caused,	or	in	the	future	would	likely	cause,	in-
jury	to	Canadian	producers	of	corn	grain.	This	decision	reaffirmed	the	deputy	minister’s	
prior	preliminary	conclusions	that	material	injury	existed	and,	thus,	provided	support	for	
his	decision	to	impose	a	provisional	duty	on	American	corn	in	order	to	protect	Canadian	
corn	growers.	The	Federal Court Act,92	however,	allowed	for	 judicial	review	if	a	board,	
commission,	or	tribunal	had,	among	other	grounds,	“based	its	decision	or	order	on	an	erro-
neous	finding	of	fact	that	it	made	in	a	perverse or capricious manner	or	without regard for 
the material before it.”93	Because	the	Tribunal’s	decision	was	based	on	a	factual	finding	of	
harm	 informed	 by	 its	 expertise,	 and	 because	 the	Act	 also	 contained	 a	 privative	 clause	
(s.	76(1))	stating	that	“every	order	or	finding	of	the	Tribunal	is	final	and	conclusive,”	this	
meant	that	the	decision	would	be	assessed	on	the	standard	of	patent	unreasonableness	so	
that	courts	could	best	respect	legislative	intent.	Review	turned	on	whether	or	not	it	was	pa-
tently	unreasonable	for	the	tribunal	to	refer	to	the	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	
(GATT)94	in	interpreting	the	SIMA,	whether	the	tribunal’s	interpretation	of	s.	42	in	its	con-
stitutive	legislation	was	unreasonable,	and	whether	the	tribunal	reached	its	decision	without	
any	cogent	evidence	to	support	its	determination	of	material	injury.
In	a	concurring	judgment,	Wilson	J.	evoked	the	CUPE	case95	to	caution	the	majority	
(and	other	like-minded	judges)	about	the	effects	of	engaging	in	a	probing	examination	of	a	
decision.	Wilson	J.	believed	that	such	a	detailed	examination	sanctioned	judicial	interven-
tion	rather	than	the	restraint	represented	by	CUPE.	CUPE	was	a	landmark	case	that	sig-
nalled	the	beginning	of	the	end	of	the	Diceyan	model	for	administrative	law.	It	concerned	
a	labour	relations	tribunal,	the	Public	Service	Staff	Relations	Board	of	New	Brunswick,	
90	 [1990]	2	S.C.R.	1324	[National Corn Growers],	online:	<http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1990/1990canlii49/
1990canlii49.pdf>.
91	 S.C.	1984,	s.	25.
92	 R.S.C.	1970,	c.	10.
93	 Ibid.,	s.	28.1(c).	Emphasis	added.	Readers	will	recall	that	these	are	familiar	expressions	connoting	arbitrari-
ness	in	decision-making.
94	 The	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	was	an	international	agreement,	originally	negotiated	in	1947,	
governing	trade	in	goods.	The	GATT	aimed	to	increase	international	trade	by	reducing	tariffs	and	other	trade	
barriers	hindering	the	free	flow	of	goods	across	national	borders.	The	GATT	was	succeeded	by	the	World	
Trade	Organization	in	1995.
95	 Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.,	 [1979]	2	S.C.R.	227	
[CUPE].	In	chapter	8,	Audrey	Macklin	describes	CUPE’s	“blockbuster”	effect	on	the	standard	of	review	in	
Canadian	administrative	law.
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which	 had	 to	 interpret	 a	 poorly	worded	 provision	 in	 its	 enabling	 statute	 concerning	 the	
meaning	of	the	word	“employee.”	The	legislation	stated	that	the	employer	could	not	replace	
striking	 employees	with	 other	 employees;	moreover,	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 statute	 excluded	
management	from	the	definition	of	employee.	The	representative	union,	the	Canadian	Union	
of	Public	Employees,	complained	to	the	Board	that	the	employer	was	replacing	striking	em-
ployees	 with	 management	 personnel,	 contrary	 to	 the	 statute.	 The	 Board	 examined	 the	
	enabling	 statute,	provided	an	 interpretation	of	 the	ambiguous	provision,	 and	ordered	 the	
employer	not	to	use	management	to	replace	striking	workers.	The	Board’s	decisions	were	
protected	by	a	privative	clause.	On	review,	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	deference	was	owed	
to	the	tribunal	based	on	its	expertise,	the	privative	clause,	and	the	reasonableness	of	its	de-
termination.	In	cases	of	statutory	ambiguity,	and	where	there	are	multiple	interpretations	that	
are	reasonable,	a	reviewing	court	should	defer	to	the	interpretation	of	the	expert	tribunal.
According	to	Wilson	J.,	CUPE’s	approach	to	the	standard	of	review,	particularly	with	
respect	to	patent	unreasonableness,	entailed	a	relationship	between	courts	and	administra-
tive	agencies	where	the	courts	should	recognize	that	(1)	administrative	agencies,	not	courts,	
bear	primary	statutory	responsibility	for	their	legislative	mandate	in	the	area	of	regulation;	
(2)	administrative	agencies	possess	expertise,	experience,	and	contextual	knowledge	about	
which	the	courts	know	very	little;	and	(3)	statutory	provisions,	such	as	those	found	in	Na-
tional Corn Growers,	do	not	admit	to	one	uniquely	correct	interpretation	but,	rather,	can	
sustain	a	variety	of	reasonable	interpretations.	Though	concurring	with	the	result	reached,	
Wilson	 J.	 clearly	 feared	 that	 such	 a	wide-ranging	 and	probing	 examination	of	 both	 the	
agency’s	 interpretation	of	 its	 enabling	 statute	 and	 the	 reasonableness	of	 its	 conclusions	
risked	reintroducing	the	correctness	standard	under	the	guise	of	reasonableness	and	dis-
placing	the	patently	unreasonable	standard.96	In	other	words,	this	approach	would	likely	gut	
the	hard-won	jurisprudential	ground	symbolized	by	the	CUPE	decision.
Wilson	J.	underscored	what	she	believed	to	be	the	appropriate	institutional	attitude	or	
posture.	In	the	face	of	a	privative	clause,	courts	must	not	engage	in	a	wide-ranging	review	
concerning	whether	or	not	the	tribunal’s	conclusions	are	unreasonable.	The	merits	of	a	tri-
bunal’s	interpretation	of	international	obligations,	such	as	the	GATT,	are	for	the	legislature	
to	address	by	amending	the	terms	of	the	statute	if	interpretive	disagreement	exists	between	
institutions.	And,	most	important,	meticulous	analysis	of	a	tribunal’s	reasoning	concerning	
the	evidence	should	not	become	the	norm.	As	she	tersely	wrote:
Faced	with	the	highly	charged	world	of	international	trade	and	a	clear	legislative	decision	to	
create	a	tribunal	to	dispose	of	disputes	that	arise	in	that	context,	it	is	highly	inappropriate	for	
courts	to	take	it	upon	themselves	to	assess	the	merits	of	the	Tribunal’s	conclusions	about	when	
the	government	may	respond	to	another	country’s	use	of	subsidies.	If	courts	were	to	take	it	
upon	themselves	to	conduct	detailed	reviews	of	these	decisions	on	a	regular	basis,	the	Tribu-
nal’s	effectiveness	and	authority	would	soon	be	effectively	undermined.97
The	conclusions	advanced	by	Wilson	J.	explicitly	rejected	the	older	Diceyan	model	in	which	
the	rule	of	law	provided	the	justification	for	judicial	control	of	administrative	agencies	and	
96	 This	worry	surfaces	in	the	discussion	of	the	so-called	intermediate	standard	of	review,	reasonableness	sim-
pliciter,	as	discussed	by	Audrey	Macklin	in	chapter	8	and	Sheila	Wildeman	in	chapter	9.
97	 National Corn Growers, supra	note	90	at	59.
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their	interpretations,	to	be	replaced	by	a	new	model	where	the	rule	of	law	buttressed	the	
“pragmatic	and	functional”	methodological	approach	to	determine	the	appropriate	standard	
of	review.	Instead	of	an	unreasonable	administrative	body	whose	straitjacket	laces	are	ever	
more	tightly	pulled	by	the	courts,	the	modern	judicial	approach	to	the	administrative	state	
ought	to	be	informed	by	a	more	flexible,	respectful,	and	contextualized	methodology	that	
recognizes	different	exercises	of	legitimate	power	by	competent	institutional	partners.
The	majority	decision	written	by	Gonthier	J.	also	concluded	that	the	tribunal	was	not	
unreasonable	with	respect	to	any	of	these	three	matters.	To	reach	this	result,	Gonthier	J.	
delved	deeply	 into	both	how	the	 tribunal	came	to	 the	decision	as	well	as	 the	decision’s	
merits.	In	the	face	of	criticism	from	the	concurring	judgment	written	by	Wilson	J.,	Gonthi-
er	J.	responded:	“With	respect,	I	do	not	understand	how	a	conclusion	can	be	reached	as	to	
the	reasonableness	of	a	tribunal’s	interpretation	of	its	enabling	statute	without	considering	
the	reasoning	underlying	it,	and	I	would	be	surprised	if	that	were	the	effect	of	this	Court’s	
decision	 in	C.U.P.E.”98	Gonthier	 J.,	however,	did	not	believe	 that	his	more	probing	ap-
proach	repudiated	CUPE;	instead,	he	continued	to	see	his	method	of	review	as	more	re-
spectful	and	deferential	than	that	found	in	the	traditional	Diceyan	model.	The	effect	of	this	
more	probing	inquiry,	however,	seemed	to	move	the	standard	of	review	away	from	patently	
unreasonable	and	closer	to	correctness.
National Corn Growers	 illustrates	how	different	 theoretical	models	can	help	explain	
how	judges	understand	their	institutional	role	as	well	as	how	these	models	shed	light	on	the	
underlying	rationale	behind	the	judicial	choice	of	the	standard	of	review.	Dicey	envisions	
the	judiciary	as	guardians	of	private-law	checks—in	his	words,	“regular	law”—on	the	ar-
bitrary	power	of	the	executive	and	its	delegates.	In	matters	of	agency	interpretation,	his	
theory	of	the	rule	of	law	argues	for	the	primacy	of	a	correctness	standard	of	review.	Fuller’s	
theory,	on	the	other	hand,	clearly	incorporates	rule	of	law	concerns	in	relation	to	the	admin-
istrative	state	and	judicial	review	of	administrative	decisions	and	envisages	a	collaborative,	
cooperative	endeavour	among	state	actors	and	institutions	to	maintain	the	rule	of	law.	In	the	
confines	of	the	case,	the	fact	that	the	tribunal	had	not	abused	its	discretion	and	had	exhibit-
ed	its	expertise	suggest	that	his	perspective	would	support	the	more	respectful	approach	ar-
ticulated	by	Wilson	J.	Indeed,	Fuller’s	concern	for	the	problems	that	polycentricity—de-
fined	 as	 complex	 networks	 of	 relationships—poses	 for	 public	 law	 underscores	 the	
importance	of	this	conclusion.99	On	his	view,	the	presence	of	polycentricity	in	a	case	means	
that	where	a	reasonable	range	of	policy	choices	exists,	or	when	multiple	reasonable	inter-
pretations	of	an	ambiguous	statutory	term	are	possible,	or	when	a	decision	involves	balanc-
ing	multiple	sets	of	competing	interests,	then	these	functions	are	best	left	with	the	expert	
tribunal.	Raz	narrows	the	reach	of	the	rule	of	law	to	correction	for	the	harms	created	by	law	
itself.	His	theory	does	not	provide	enough	details	concerning	a	role	for	the	rule	of	law	as	a	
98	 Ibid.	at	40-41.
99	 In	“The	Form	and	Limits	of	Adjudication,”	Fuller	controversially	claimed	that	polycentric	disputes	are	in-
herently	unsuitable	for	adjudication	and	should	therefore	be	considered	non-justiciable.	According	to	Fuller,	
polycentricity	is	both	pervasive	and	a	matter	of	degree.	Private	law	disputes,	by	contrast,	take	the	familiar	
form	of	a	bipolar	encounter	between	plaintiff	and	defendant,	and	will	likely	have	few	polycentric	elements.	
The	problem	Fuller	identified	is	that	of	knowing	when	polycentric	elements	have	become	so	significant	that	
the	proper	limits	of	adjudication	have	been	reached	such	that	these	disputes	should	be	resolved	in	the	legis-
lature	or	by	the	market.	(1978)	92	Harv.	L.	Rev.	353.
104	 Chapter	4	 Governments	in	Miniature
check	on	the	arbitrary	use	of	political	power	exercised	in	“non-legal”	ways,	such	as	deci-
sion-making	power	within	 the	administrative	state.100	This	omission,	however,	points	 to	
some	support	for	Gonthier’s	approach	as	the	best	way	to	control	harms	created	by	the	ad-
ministrative	state,	but	perhaps	less	so	for	the	risks	created	by	judicial	oversight.	A	different	
case	might	produce	a	different	alignment.	If,	for	example,	the	third	standard	of	review—
reasonableness—had	been	available	at	the	time	of	National Corn Growers,	a	unanimous	
decision	on	the	appropriateness	of	this	standard	might	have	been	reached.	As	with	so	many	
aspects	of	administrative	law,	context	matters	greatly,	 though	your	own	tendencies	con-
cerning	the	appropriate	ways	that	the	rule	of	law	constrains	judges	and	administrative	deci-
sion-makers	might	reflect	one	approach	more	than	another.
d.   two Problems for deference as respect:  
Privative clauses and the choice of the Standard of review
1. Privative Clauses
As	seen	in	the	National Corn Growers	case	discussed	above,	privative	or	ouster	clauses	
historically	posed	challenges	for	the	rule	of	law.	Several	types	of	privative	clauses	exist,	but	
the	general	form	is	a	statutory	provision	protecting	the	decisions	made	by	public	officials	
in	boards,	tribunals,	and	ministries	either	from	further	dispute	internally	(that	is,	a	finality	
clause)	or	from	judicial	review	(that	is,	an	ouster	clause).101	The	powers	conferred	on	ad-
ministrative	agencies	through	privative	clauses	were	often	conferred	in	absolute	terms	and,	
therefore,	decisions	were	meant	to	be	final.	The	conundrum	for	courts	was	that	the	statute	
prescribed	limits	on	delegated	power	but,	at	the	same	time,	authorized	officials	to	act	with	
seemingly	unfettered	discretion	within	those	broad	confines.	The	risk	to	the	accountability	
function	of	the	rule	of	law	was	that	these	officials	could	behave	as	a	law	unto	themselves	
because	they	would	be	the	sole	judges	of	the	substantive	validity	of	their	own	acts.	The	
	institutional	result	of	privative	clauses	was	a	system	of	competing	and	irreconcilable	su-
premacies	between	the	legislative	and	judicial	branches	of	government.	Those	who	sup-
ported	the	development	of	the	administrative	state,	meanwhile,	worried	about	the	growth	
of	administrative	law	and	the	consequent	judicial	review	of	administrative	decisions,	see-
ing	judicial	scrutiny	as	an	altogether	too	constraining	legalism	that	would	hinder	the	flexi-
ble	regulation	needed	in	a	complex	industrialized	society.102
Courts	approached	privative	clauses	in	several	different	ways:	reading	them	out	of	the	
statute	if	a	jurisdictional	error	was	implicated	in	the	case,	or	deferring	completely	to	Parlia-
ment’s	intent	to	oust	judicial	oversight.	Finally,	and	later,	they	developed	methods	of	statu-
tory	interpretation	grounded	in	the	common-law	presumption	that	Parliament	always	intends	
100	 This	is	not	an	argument	that	his	theory	cannot	incorporate	discretionary	decision-making.
101	 For	a	discussion	of	privative	clauses	in	administrative	law,	see	Audrey	Macklin,	chapter	8,	and	Sheila	Wilde-
man,	chapter	9.	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	history,	types,	and	constitutional	effects	of	privative	clauses,	
see	David	Dyzenhaus,	“Disobeying	Parliament?	Privative	Clauses	and	the	Rule	of	Law”	in	Richard	W.	Bau-
man	&	Tsvi	Kahana,	eds., The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State 
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006)	at	499.
102	 As	Audrey	Macklin	points	out	in	chapter	8,	the	motive	behind	privative	clauses	was	not	to	oust	judicial	
meddling	(or	not	primarily),	but	to	provide	efficient	resolution	of	disputes	and	allocate	scarce	judicial	re-
sources	by	restricting	access	to	the	courts.
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to	respect	procedural	fairness,	even	with	respect	to	statutorily	delegated	powers	with	broad	
scope.103	This	last	approach	laid	the	basis	for	deference	as	respect,	found	in	the	CUPE	deci-
sion,	in	which	the	privative	clause	came	to	be	viewed	as	a	communication	from	the	legisla-
ture	that	courts	should	recognize	the	interpretive	authority	of	the	tribunal	within	its	area	of	
expertise,	but	that	judges	could	exercise	their	rule	of	law	powers	of	oversight	on	constitu-
tional	and	jurisdictional	matters.	Nevertheless,	the	modern	development	of	deference	and	re-
spect	for	administrative	tribunals	is	both	an	ongoing	and	vulnerable	achievement.
Finally,	privative	clauses	and	unwritten	principles	uncannily	mirror	each	other.	As	dis-
cussed	in	part	III,	above,	judges	seem	to	have	an	interpretive	monopoly	on	unwritten	prin-
ciples,	thereby	“ousting”	interpretations	from	other	branches	of	government.	Robust	use	of	
unwritten	principles—and	ironically	the	rule	of	law	itself—risks	entrenching	the	elitist	rule	
of	judges	and	opens	the	door	to	judicial	arbitrariness,	the	obverse	of	legislatively	sanctioned	
administrative	arbitrariness	due	to	the	power	of	privative	clauses.	This	points	to	a	concep-
tion	of	the	rule	of	law,	which	recognizes	that	all	branches	of	government	have	a	duty	to	real-
ize	a	rule	of	law	state	and	that	all	branches	can	fail	to	do	so	in	their	distinctive	ways.
2. The Choice of the Standard of Review
We	have	also	seen	that	pre-Charter	administrative	law	was	limited	to	the	review	of	ques-
tions	 of	 law,	 jurisdiction,	 and	 procedural	 fairness	 in	 order	 to	 determine	whether	 or	 not	
	decision-makers	acted	in	excess	of	jurisdiction,	without	authority,	or	had	otherwise	abused	
their	discretion	on	unreasonable	grounds.	Reviewing	courts	were	not	to	examine	the	full	
merits	of	the	decision,	save	on	exceptional	grounds,	so	that	they	would	be	constrained	from	
substituting	their	preferred	policy	outcome	for	that	of	authorized	decision-makers.	Judicial	
interpretation	of	the	rule	of	law	and	other	legal	principles,	such	as	the	separation	of	powers,	
animated	the	level	of	deference	shown	to	administrative	bodies.	This	deference	was	most	
fully	exhibited	in	the	choice	of	the	standard	of	review—correctness	and	patent	unreason-
ableness	(with	reasonableness	as	a	post-Charter	development)—that	were	applied	in	order	
to	analyze	a	particular	administrative	decision.	The	standard	of	review	therefore	functioned	
as	a	prime	rule-of-law	constraint	on	judges	in	administrative	law.
As	an	ideal	then,	the	standard	of	review	indicates	a	court’s	understanding	of	independ-
ence	 and	 expertise	 within	 these	 administrative	 bodies,	 regulates	 the	 contours	 of	 the	
	administrative	 state	 and	 its	 exercises	 of	 power,	 and	 controls	 the	 discretionary	 features	
within	the	exercise	of	judicial	review.	Whether	the	ideal	succeeds	in	practice,	however,	is	
the	 subject	of	 several	chapters	 in	 this	book.104	And,	as	we	have	seen	 in	National Corn 
Growers,	the	contemporary	approach	to	the	standard	of	review	reflects	concerns	about	ju-
dicial	legitimacy	within	a	democratic	state—a	state	that	has	wielded	a	democratic	mandate	
to	create	administrative	and	policy	frameworks.	The	pragmatic	and	functional	approach	
used	 to	weigh	 the	 criteria	 involved	 in	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 standard	 of	 review	 illustrated	
courts’	attempts	to	grapple	with	the	sheer	variety	of	administrative	bodies,	while	also	af-
firming	the	legitimacy	of	review	of	the	multiplicity	of	decisions	and	rulings.	The	pragmatic	
103	 See	Evan	Fox-Decent,	chapter	7,	for	his	discussion	of	privative	clauses	and	procedural	fairness.
104	 See	in	particular	the	two	chapters	on	the	standard	of	review:	chapter	8	by	Audrey	Macklin	and	chapter	9	by	
Sheila	Wildeman.	On	Wildeman’s	account,	this	author	tends	toward	a	romantic	reading	of	the	development	
of	the	standards	of	review.
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and	functional	approach	responds	both	to	the	nature	of	the	tribunal	as	well	as	the	nature	of	
the	issue	that	is	subject	to	appeal.	Deference	will	be	shown	when	a	match	exists	between	tri-
bunal	expertise	and	the	issue.	Review	on	the	correctness	standard	allows	courts	to	show	very	
little	to	no	deference	to	agency	decision-making:	the	decision	is	either	right	or	wrong.	This	
standard	is	applied	when	the	agency	has	very	little	expertise	or	when	the	issue	involves	the	
interpretation	of	general	law	or	constitutional	matters.	Patent	unreasonableness	is	the	most	
deferential	or	respectful	standard	and	is	considered	appropriate	when	review	involves	a	poly-
centric,	complex	question	concerning	 the	regulation	of	activities	within	 the	mandate	of	a	
highly	specialized	agency.	The	court	will	only	intervene	when	it	is	blatantly	evident	that	the	
agency	has	made	an	error	of	law	or	of	fact.	Reasonableness,	the	intermediate	standard,	re-
flects	a	justified	degree	of	judicial	deference	or	respect	for	the	challenged	decision	or	action.
The	tensions	among	the	rule	of	law,	deference,	the	standard	of	review,	and	the	adminis-
trative	state	were	forcefully	made	in	the	Baker	case,105	which	involved	the	review	of	an	im-
migration	officer’s	 biased	decision	 in	 the	 context	of	 a	humanitarian	 and	 compassionate	
grounds	 application	by	 an	 illegal	 immigrant.106	On	 some	 accounts,	Baker	 represents	 an	
	instance	of	judicial	creativity	in	the	crafting	of	a	context-specific	duty	to	give	reasons,	par-
ticularly	in	the	immigration	sphere.	Courts	normally	show	a	large	degree	of	deference	in	this	
policy	area,	given	the	expertise	of	the	decision-maker	in	immigration	cases.107	Instead,	the	
treatment	of	one	individual	at	the	hands	of	the	administrative	state	precipitated	the	expan-
sion	of	the	content	of	the	duty	of	fairness,	a	vital	component	of	the	rule	of	law,	in	an	area	
usually	demanding	correctness.108	On	this	point,	L’Heureux-Dubé	J.	for	the	majority	wrote:
The	pragmatic	and	functional	approach	can	take	into	account	the	fact	that	the	more	discretion	
that	is	left	to	a	decision-maker,	the	more	reluctant	courts	should	be	to	interfere	with	the	manner	
in	which	decision-makers	have	made	choices	among	various	options.	However,	though	discre-
tionary	decisions	will	generally	be	given	considerable	respect,	that	discretion	must	be	exer-
cised	in	accordance	with	the	boundaries	imposed	in	the	statute,	the	principles	of	the	rule	of	
law,	the	principles	of	administrative	law,	the	fundamental	values	of	Canadian	society,	and	the	
principles	of	the	Charter.109
According	to	the	Court,	the	administrative	decision	in	Baker	displayed	arbitrariness:	it	
did	not	exhibit	a	mind	that	was	attuned	to	the	humanitarian	and	compassionate	require-
ments	stipulated	in	the	department’s	own	guidelines;	it	showed	a	lack	of	regard	for	the	per-
105	 Baker, supra	note	71.
106	 The	facts	of	Baker	are	described	more	fully	by	Grant	Huscroft	in	chapter	5.
107	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 fact-specific	 nature	 of	 the	 inquiry,	 the	 role	 of	 a	 humanitarian	 and	 compassionate	
grounds	application	within	the	statutory	scheme	as	an	exception,	the	fact	that	the	decision-maker	is	the	min-
ister,	and	the	considerable	discretion	evidenced	by	the	statutory	language	suggest	that	a	large	degree	of	def-
erence	would	be	appropriate.	On	the	other	hand,	the	absence	of	a	privative	clause,	the	explicit	contemplation	
of	judicial	review	by	the	Federal	Court,	and	the	individual	rather	than	polycentric	nature	of	the	decision,	ar-
gued	against	patent	unreasonableness	as	the	proper	standard.	“Reasonableness,”	the	intermediate	standard,	
was	therefore	chosen.
108	 Grant	Huscroft	provides	a	more	detailed	examination	of	the	scope	and	content	of	the	duty	of	fairness	in	
chapter	5.	Historically,	the	duty	of	fairness	was	a	jurisdictional	question	and	therefore	required	correctness.	
Privative	clauses	could	not	protect	procedural	errors.
109	 Baker, supra	note	71	at	para.	56.
IV.	 Administering	the	Rule	of	Law	 107
son	affected;	and	it	gave	the	impression	that	important	factors,	such	as	the	best	interests	of	
the	 children,	were	outweighed	by	discriminatory	biases.	The	decision	 therefore	did	not	
meet	the	threshold	of	reasonableness	that	could	“command	respect”	from	the	reviewers.	
Mavis	Baker	and	her	counsel	were	lucky	to	gain	access	to	the	“reasons”	for	the	negative	
decision	in	her	case.	In	order	to	control	for	the	arbitrariness	of	luck,	the	Court	imposed	a	
duty	to	give	reasons	on	statutory	and	prerogative	decision-makers	in	certain	administrative	
contexts	where	important	individual	interests	are	at	stake.	Despite	the	fact	that	this	is	not	a	
general	duty	for	all	decision-makers	in	the	state,	it	nevertheless	still	stands	as	a	substantive	
procedural	protection.	Ideally,	the	duty	to	give	reasons	has	the	potential	to	advance	both	
restraint	and	respect,	thereby	facilitating	rule	of	law	concerns	and	administrative	legitima-
cy.	Reasons	stand	as	an	opportunity	for	the	agency	to	show	both	its	expertise	and	its	con-
cern	for	affected	individuals	by	observing	procedural	fairness.	Judicial	recognition	of	rea-
sons—that	 is,	 acknowledgment	 that	 the	 reasons	 are	 justified	 and	 justifiable—constrains	
reweighing	the	factors	and	affirms	specific	instances	of	non-arbitrary	decision-making.	On	this	
account,	deference	does	not	occur	simply	because	the	statute	has	a	privative	clause	ordering	
courts	not	to	intervene;	rather,	deference	is	the	result	of	institutional	competence,	expertise,	
and	mutual	respect	for	the	rule	of	law.
As	others	in	this	casebook	will	discuss,	no	a priori	answer	exists	within	the	pragmatic	
and	functional	approach	to	discerning	the	proper	scope	of	deference.	General	tendencies	
based	on	institutional	history—labour	boards,	for	example—may	exist,	but	a	“one	size	fits	
all”	approach	to	bodies	and	types	of	decision-making	should	be	avoided.110	Those	who	ap-
preciate	certainty	as	a	rule	of	law	value,	however,	will	find	the	lack	of	predictability	con-
cerning	 when	 a	 court	 will	 or	 will	 not	 recognize	 agency	 expertise	 both	 frustrating	 and	
troubling.
Despite	the	continuing	problem	of	the	standard	of	review,	Baker	nevertheless	represents	
an	important	link	in	the	rule-of-law	narrative	that	can	be	traced	back	to	Roncarelli.	Like	
Roncarelli,	Baker	discloses	that	administrative	and	constitutional	law	are	attuned	to	under-
lying	 fundamental	 values	 such	 as	 basic	 concerns	 for	 human	 dignity,	 the	 vindication	 of	
rights,	and	the	effects	of	political	power	on	individuals.	Public	law,	on	this	account,	discov-
ers	its	normative	aim	in	the	need	to	find	justification	for	all	exercises	of	public	power.	Yet	
this	awareness	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	judicial	supremacy.	Instead,	courts	ought	
to	respect	institutional	partners	that	justify	their	use	of	public	power	as	reasonable	and	com-
mit	to	the	values	that	underpin	the	exercise	of	that	public	power.	Discretion,	therefore,	is	
always	structured	and	constrained.	Baker	confirms	the	shift	to	a	value-centric	approach	to	
the	rule	of	law	in	a	modern	constitutional	democracy.111
110	 Colleen	Flood	and	Lorne	Sossin,	for	example,	argue	that	the	myriad	number	of	delegated	powers	favours	
the	perspective	that	a	spectrum	of	possibilities	exists	within	the	three	standards	of	review.	The	methodology	
should	therefore	mirror	the	approach	to	procedural	fairness	where	instead	of	three	standards,	courts	would	
look	to	a	wide	range	of	factors	in	order	to	determine	the	degree	of	deference	using	one	comprehensive	stan-
dard.	See	Lorne	Sossin	&	Colleen	M.	Flood,	“The	Contextual	Turn:	Iacobucci’s	Legacy	and	the	Standard	of	
Review	in	Administrative	Law”	(2007)	57	U.T.L.J.	581.
111	 See	Mary	Liston,	“‘Alert,	Alive	and	Sensitive’:	Baker,	the	Duty	to	Give	Reasons	and	the	Ethos	of	Justifica-
tion	in	Canadian	Public	Law”	for	this	understanding	of	Baker	in	David	Dyzenhaus,	ed.,	The Unity of Public 
Law	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	2004).	This	collection	of	essays	offers	a	multi-perspectival	examination	of	a	
public	law	culture	of	justification	through	the	lens	of	Baker.
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e.  constraining the charter
The	Charter	now	provides	many	express	grounds	by	which	courts	may	review	the	exercise	
of	statutory	or	discretionary	powers.	A	recent	development	in	the	relationship	between	the	
Charter	and	administrative	bodies	is	the	judicial	finding	that	an	administrative	tribunal	may	
have	the	jurisdiction	to	consider	Charter	challenges	to	its	enabling	legislation.112	This	de-
termination	represents	a	major	shift	in	the	earlier	approach,	which	arrogated	the	power	to	
determine	questions	of	law	to	courts,	while	leaving	administrative	bodies	the	power	to	in-
terpret	and	apply	their	enabling	legislation.	Originally,	only	administrative	tribunals	that	
structurally	 and	 purposively	mirrored	 courts	 possessed	 the	 jurisdiction	 to	 hear	 Charter	
claims.	Now,	sometimes	the	enabling	legislation	will	empower	an	administrative	tribunal	
to	 interpret	 and	 apply	 all	 law,	 including	 the	Charter,	while	 at	 other	 times	 the	 statutory	
scheme	as	a	whole	will	confer	an	implicit	jurisdiction.	These	changes	are	grounded	in	con-
cerns	for	access	to	justice	and	a	recognition	of	the	competence	and	capacity	of	such	tribunals	
as	legal	bodies	to	review	legislation.	On	this	understanding,	jurisdiction	to	apply	the	Charter	
to	enabling	legislation	is	given	by	the	legislature	in	the	statute	and	does	not	arise	solely	from	
the	constitutional	text.	Certain	rule	of	law	considerations	stemming	from	the	separation	of	
powers	will	flow	from	this	more	restrained	mandate:	the	scope	of	the	remedies	that	an	ad-
ministrative	tribunal	can	grant	will	be	limited;	the	particular	decision	will	not	be	binding	au-
thority	as	precedent	for	future	cases;	and,	in	subsequent	judicial	review,	the	decision	will	be	
subject	to	a	standard	of	correctness,	ensuring	that	it	receives	little	or	no	curial	deference.
The	Charter	can	significantly	constrain	delegations	of	broad	discretionary	powers	where	
Charter	rights	and	freedoms	are	directly	or	indirectly	implicated,	or	which	may	not	be	suf-
ficiently	confined	by	the	terms	of	the	enabling	statute	in	question.	So,	while	the	existence	
of	broad	discretionary	powers	is	not	suspect	in	itself,	courts	could	be	more	demanding	in	
cases	that	involve	broad	delegations	of	power	by	ensuring	that	discretion	is	structured	or	
confined	within	the	parameters	of	the	Charter.	Where	Charter	rights	and	freedoms	are	not	at	
issue,	 courts	may	 tolerate	 broad	 discretionary	 powers,	 but	 they	may	 also	 attend	 to	 the	
	effects	of	this	power	in	individual	cases.
The	ability	of	administrative	agencies	to	question	unconstitutional	enabling	provisions	
not	only	provides	an	economical	and	efficient	resolution	of	a	rights	dispute	(avoiding	the	
need	to	go	to	court),	but	also	conforms	to	the	emerging	“institutional	dialogue”	or	“defer-
ence	as	 respect”	 institutional	model.	This	democratically	 informed	perspective	emerged	
clearly	in	the	dissent	written	by	McLachlin	J.	(as	she	then	was)	and	L’Heureux-Dubé	J.	in	
the	case	Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission).	This	case	concerned	the	funda-
mental	question	of	whether	or	not	human	rights	tribunals	have	the	authority	to	determine	
the	constitutionality	of	provisions	in	their	enabling	statutes.	In	Cooper,	 they	wrote	a	re-
sounding	affirmation:
The	Charter	 is	not	some	holy	grail	which	only	judicial	 initiates	of	the	superior	courts	may	
touch.	The	Charter	belongs	to	the	people.	All	law	and	law-makers	that	touch	the	people	must	
conform	to	it.	Tribunals	and	commissions	charged	with	deciding	legal	issues	are	no	exception.	
112	 See	Evan	Fox-Decent,	chapter	7,	for	a	discussion	of	the	difficulties	in	the	relationship	between	the	Charter 
and	administrative	law,	including	agency	jurisdiction	over	the	Charter	and	the	recent	trilogy	of	cases	affirm-
ing	tribunal	authority	to	consider	questions	of	law.
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Many	more	citizens	have	their	rights	determined	by	these	tribunals	than	by	the	courts.	If	the	
Charter	is	to	be	meaningful	to	ordinary	people,	then	it	must	find	its	expression	in	the	decisions	
of	these	tribunals.113
The	institutional	aspiration	underlying	this	vision	is	to	create	a	constitutional	democracy	that	
reconciles	the	formerly	competing	sovereignties	and	reinforces	institutional	competencies	
for	the	benefit	of	citizens.
f.  Institutional dialogue and the canadian rule of law
Political	and	legal	theories	differ	in	their	characterization	of	the	relationship	between	dem-
ocracy	and	the	rule	of	law,	but	most	allude	to	various	tensions	in	that	relationship.	Such	
tensions	come	to	a	head	when	the	rule	of	law	is	associated	mainly	with	the	courts	in	what	
comes	to	be	seen	as	an	antagonistic	relationship	of	judges	against	the	legislature	and	demo-
cratic	will	formation.
As	we	have	seen,	 the	Diceyan	conception	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	supported	parliamentary	
democracy	but	employed	administrative	law,	judicially	enforced	in	ordinary	courts,	to	con-
trol	the	policy-making	branches	of	the	state—that	is,	the	executive	and	the	bureaucracy.	But,	
while	institutional	and	policy	differentiation	characterizes	the	modern	state,	the	Diceyan	rule	
of	law	authorized	judges	to	enforce	constitutional	fundamentals	and	institutional	coherence	
uniformly	throughout	the	state.	Principles	derived	from	private	law	controlled	public	bod-
ies	and	Dicey	rejected	the	notion	that	a	separate	branch	of	public	law	should	develop	in	the	
British	system.	
A	similar,	but	different,	antagonism	plays	out	in	judicial	review	of	legislation	under	a	
written	bill	of	rights	like	the	Charter	in	cases	where	individual	rights	and	public	goods	dir-
ectly	conflict.	Section	II.A	on	the	legal	control	of	substantive	arbitrariness	above	alluded	to	
the	normativity	of	the	legal	subject	animating	individual	rights	against	the	state	as	well	as	
the	 duties	with	which	 the	 state	must	 comply.	This	 normativity	 potentially	 authorizes	 a	
greater	intervention,	not	just	in	the	decision-making	procedures,	but	in	the	very	heart	or	
substance	of	a	public	authority’s	decision	that	affects	important	individual	interests.	
A	current	and	prominent	proponent	of	this	approach	to	judicial	review	can	be	found	in	
the	philosophy	of	Ronald	Dworkin.114	Dworkin’s	legal	subject	is	an	individual	bearer	of	
rights	who	is	entitled	to	demand	the	resolution	of	disputes	over	the	content	of	these	rights	
through	the	legal	system—specifically	through	courts,	which	he	calls	the	“independent	fo-
rum	of	principle.”115	Dworkin’s	theory	therefore	grounds	a	vision	of	a	constitutionalized	
113	 Cooper, supra	note	24	at	para.	70.
114	 Two	significant	texts	for	this	argument	are	Dworkin’s	A Matter of Principle	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	Uni-
versity	Press,	1985)	and	Law’s Empire	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1986).	As	a	legal	phi-
losopher,	 Dworkin	 participates	 in	 a	 branch	 of	 philosophy	 called	 deontological	 liberalism,	 a	 liberalism	
popularized	by	the	work	of	John	Rawls.	Deontological	liberalism	holds	that	the	purpose	of	politics	is	to	al-
low	people	who	possess	many	different	conceptions	of	value	to	pursue	their	individual	ends	to	the	greatest	
degree	possible.	This	form	of	liberalism	adheres	to	a	theory	of	equality	that	“supposes	that	political	deci-
sions	must	be,	so	far	as	it	is	possible,	independent	of	any	particular	conception	of	the	good	life.”	Ronald	
Dworkin,	“Liberalism”	in	A Matter of Principle	at	191.
115	 See	A Matter of Principle,	ibid.	at	30-32	and	chapter	2,	“The	Forum	of	Principle.”
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public	morality	that	he	calls	the	“rights	conception	of	the	rule	of	law.”116	For	Dworkin,	the	
rule	of	law	necessarily	entails	the	judicial	determination	of	rights	through	principled	inter-
pretation	in	hard	cases	where	a	legal	answer	must	be	crafted	by	judges	rather	than	“given”	
by	existing	legal	sources.	Principled	interpretation	is	based	on	rules,	principles,	the	con-
comitant	interpretation	of	how	these	rules	and	principles	appropriately	fit	with	positive	law,	
and,	importantly,	how	a	judicial	decision	expresses	its	compatibility	with	selected	princi-
ples	from	a	larger	political	morality.	Government	respect	for	individual	freedom	and	the	
autonomy	of	non-governmental	spheres	of	authority,	for	example,	would	be	requirements	
of	a	Dworkinian	political	morality.
Dworkin’s	theory	of	adjudication	advances	a	strong	political	morality	because	it	has	as	
its	central	focus	a	concept	of	justice	designed	to	further	political	principles	of	autonomy,	
dignity,	equality,	and	liberty	for	all	individuals	in	the	political	community.	Politics,	on	his	
account,	should	be	held	to	a	higher	standard	than	pragmatism	or	consequentialism	would	
allow	because	 the	political	 system	ought	 to	place	 the	pursuit	 of	 justice	higher	 than	 the	
maintenance	of	political	power,	stability,	or	general	welfare.	Liberalism,	his	primary	politi-
cal	morality,	takes	precedence	over	the	political	morality	associated	with	democracy,	such	
as	majority	decision-making	embodied	in	legislation,	or	the	focus	on	the	common	good	
from	communitarianism.	One	consequence	of	Dworkin’s	theory	is	that	judges,	not	legisla-
tors,	are	ultimately	charged	with	guarding	the	moral	integrity	of	the	political	order	because,	
as	the	chief	political	actors	in	the	form	of	principle,	they	possess	the	knowledge	and	the	
skills—honed	through	their	unique	access	to	the	interpretation	of	the	law—to	be	the	better	
articulators	of	a	constitutionalized	public	morality.
Nevertheless,	if	courts	should	respect	pluralism	as	a	political	fact,	and	ideological	plu-
ralism	in	particular,	their	job	is	not	to	endorse	wholeheartedly	one	particular	substantive	
political	morality:	that,	many	critics	of	Dworkin	argue,	is	typically	seen	as	the	role	of	the	
political	sphere.117	But,	when	confronted	with	conflicting	demands,	courts	should	seek	to	
construct	a	principled	balance	among	competing	goods	or	reconcile	conflicting	rights	as	the	
appropriate	remedy.	The	interpretive	role	of	the	courts	in	public	law	means	that	they	must	
construct	in	their	rulings	a	reasonable	normative	and	narrative	coherence	to	explain	the	na-
ture	of	the	conflict	and	the	appropriateness	of	the	decision	in	favour	of	one	balance	over	
another.	Government	justification	of	limitations	on	rights	and	the	possibility	of	legislative	
response	either	through	reply	legislation	or	the	notwithstanding	clause	represent	crucial	in-
stitutional	restraints	on	this	form	of	judicial	power	in	the	Canadian	order.118	Taken	together,	
116	 Ibid.	at	11-12.
117	 Many	democratic	theorists	have	attacked	Dworkin’s	theory	of	adjudication	and	his	conception	of	the	rule	of	
law.	See,	for	example,	the	collection	of	essays	in	Allan	C.	Hutchinson	and	Patrick	Monahan,	eds.,	The Rule 
of Law: Ideal or Ideology	 (Toronto:	Carswell,	1987);	Jeremy	Waldron,	Law and Disagreement	 (Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	1999);	Christopher	Manfredi,	Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the 
Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism,	2d	ed.	(Toronto:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001);	and	Ran	Hirschl,	
Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism	(Cambridge,	MA:	Har-
vard	University	Press,	2004).
118	 See,	for	example,	Wilson	J.’s	characterization	of	s.	1	of	the	Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms	(the	
Charter)	Part	I	of	the	Constitution Act, 1982,	being	Schedule	B	to	the	Canada Act 1982	(U.K.),	1982,	c.	11	
in	her	dissent	in	Operation Dismantle,	supra	note	24	at	para.	104:	“Section	1,	in	my	opinion,	is	the	uniquely	
Canadian	mechanism	through	which	the	courts	are	to	determine	the	justiciability	of	particular	issues	that	
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these	three	aspects	of	the	rule	of	law—the	principle	of	legality,	institutional	practices,	and	
a	distinctive	political	morality—argue	for	an	understanding	of	the	political	order	as	a	joint	
effort	in	governance	on	the	part	of	institutions	and	citizens.	In	Canada,	this	joint	effort	in	
upholding	the	rule	of	law	is	often	described	as	an	“institutional	dialogue.”119
The	specific	nature	of	 this	 joint	effort	 in	governance	 is	controversial.	Though	 liberal	
democratic	theory	emphasizes	that	no	branch	of	government	should	possess	complete	con-
trol	of	 sovereignty,	disputes	 rage	about	whether	public	power	 should	be	 shared	equally	
among	the	state	institutions	or	whether	one	branch	should	retain	overall	supremacy.120	In	
Canada’s	pre-Charter	Westminster	 system	of	government,	 for	 example,	 the	principle	of	
parliamentary	sovereignty	traditionally	meant	that	Parliament	could	pass	laws	on	any	sub-
ject,	and	that	no	institution	or	person	could	override	or	strike	down	these	laws.	The	rule	of	
law	required	that	statutes	meet	the	“manner	and	form”	criteria	of	enactment:	that	is,	the	
legislature	must	be	identified	as	the	proper	source	of	law	and	the	proper	legislative	proced-
ure	must	be	used.	Existence	of	these	two	factors	sufficed	in	order	to	recognize	a	statute	as	
valid	or	“prescribed	by	law,”	and	this	recognition	should	be	considered	legitimate	by	all	in-
stitutions	and	persons,	including	the	judiciary.	In	the	pre-Charter	world	of	public	law,	the	
authority	of	legislatures	was	not	constrained	by	courts,	but	rather	by	political	sanctions.	
Political	 sanctions	manifested	 themselves	 through	 regular	 elections	 as	well	 as	 political	
conventions	such	as	ministerial	responsibility	in	which	Cabinet	ministers	faced	demands	
for	accountability	by	way	of	scrutiny	in	question	period.
The	enactment	of	 the	Charter	has	altered	 the	principle	of	parliamentary	 sovereignty.	
Constitutional	rights	can	be	limited	subject	to	the	government	satisfying	the	justificatory	
requirements	of	s.	1	in	the	Charter.	As	well,	legislatures	can	theoretically	respond	to	judi-
cial	rulings	by	using	the	s.	33	notwithstanding	clause	to	override	decisions	temporarily.	In	
this	way,	Canada	continues	to	endorse	the	principle	of	parliamentary	sovereignty,	but	rec-
onciles	it	with	the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	as	manifested	in	judicial	review.	However,	
the	legitimacy	of	judicial	decision-making	in	matters	of	political	controversy	and	policy	
remains	in	dispute,	a	debate	that	has	been	exacerbated	by	the	Charter.	At	times,	the	judicial	
come	before	it.	It	embodies	through	its	reference	to	a	free	and	democratic	society	the	essential	features	of	
our	constitution	including	the	separation	of	powers,	responsible	government	and	the	rule	of	law.	It	obviates	
the	need	for	a	‘political	questions’	doctrine	and	permits	the	Court	to	deal	with	what	might	be	termed	‘pru-
dential’	considerations	in	a	principled	way	without	renouncing	its	constitutional	and	mandated	responsibility	
for	judicial	review.”
119	 Noteworthy	articles	from	the	voluminous	literature	on	institutional	dialogue	include	T.R.S.	Allan,	“Consti-
tutional	Dialogue	and	the	Justification	of	Judicial	Review”	(2003)	23	Oxford	J.	Legal	Stud.	563;	Stephen	
Gardbaum,	“The	New	Commonwealth	Model	of	Constitutionalism”	(2001)	49	Am.	J.	Comp.	L.	707;	Peter	
W.	Hogg	&	Allison	A.	Bushell,	“The	Charter	Dialogue	Between	Courts	and	Legislatures	(or	Perhaps	the	
Charter	of	Rights	Isn’t	Such	a	Bad	Thing	After	All)”	(1997)	35	Osgoode	Hall	L.J.	75;	Christopher	P.	Man-
fredi,	“The	Life	of	a	Metaphor:	Dialogue	in	the	Supreme	Court,	1998-2003”	(2004)	23	Sup.	Ct.	L.	Rev. (2d)	
105;	Kent	Roach,	The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue	(Toronto:	Irwin	
Law,	2001);	and	Jeremy	Waldron,	“Some	Models	of	Dialogue	Between	Judges	and	Legislatures”	(2004)	23	
Sup.	Ct.	L.	Rev.	(2d)	7.
120	 See	Jürgen	Habermas	for	an	argument	supporting	co-equal	status	between	the	principles	of	democracy	and	
the	rule	of	law:	Jürgen	Habermas,	“Constitutional	Democracy:	A	Paradoxical	Union	of	Contradictory	Princi-
ples”	(2001)	29	Pol.	Theory	766,	and	“On	the	Internal	Relation	Between	the	Rule	of	Law	and	Democracy”	in	
Patrick	Hayden,	ed.,	Philosophical Perspectives on Law and Politics	(New	York:	Peter	Lang,	1999)	327.
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role	goes	beyond	applying	the	rule	of	law	understood	as	the	principle	of	legality	to	an	activ-
ity	that	appears	more	legislative	or	discretionary	in	nature—that	is,	the	ability	to	make	law	
or	intervene	in	policy	development.	The	litmus	test	for	this	debate	is	whether	or	not	one	
believes	 that	 in	a	reasonably	democratic	society	with	functioning	 legislatures,	where	 its	
citizens	disagree	about	the	scope	and	content	of	rights,	judicial	review	of	legislation	con-
stitutes	an	inappropriate	mode	of	final	decision-making.121	In	administrative	law,	this	kind	
of	activity	is	particularly	controversial	if	it	means	judges	can,	in	certain	cases	and	with	a	
constrained	approach,	“reweigh”	the	factors	that	administrative	decision-makers	use	based	
on	their	expertise	and	experiential	knowledge,	if	such	decisions	violate	constitutional	val-
ues.122	Those	who	support	this	conclusion	argue	that	the	Charter	reinforces	the	constitu-
tional	commitment	that	all	persons—individuals,	corporations,	and	state	actors—must	ad-
here	to	the	rule	of	law	and	respect	fundamental	constitutional	values.
g.  other routes to accountability in the administrative State
Just	as	a	“one	size	fits	all”	approach	does	not	exist	in	the	courts,	so	too	in	the	state.123	Judicial	
review	represents	an	important,	but	not	the	sole,	route	to	securing	administrative	account-
ability.	Courts	should	be	seen	as	merely	one	among	the	many	means	by	which	we	hold	
government	to	account.	Moreover,	it	will	be	better	for	the	legitimacy	of	courts	if	we	recog-
nize	them	as	one	among	a	“family”	of	legitimate	routes	to	securing	accountability	within	a	
liberal	democratic	state:	public	inquiries,	task	forces,	departmental	investigations,	and	om-
budsmen.	The	rule	of	law	will	also	inform	the	various	institutional	alternatives	to	judicial	
review	of	government	action.124
121	 See	Jeremy	Waldron,	“The	Core	of	the	Case	Against	Judicial	Review”	(2006)	115	Yale	L.J.	1346.	Although	
Waldron	is	discussing	the	role	of	the	judiciary	in	the	United	States,	his	argument	finds	purchase	in	Canada	
with	critics	who	bemoan	the	growth	of	judicial	activism	and	the	inability	of	legislatures	to	use	the	notwith-
standing	clause	to	advance	a	different	interpretation	of	a	constitutional	matter	for	fear	of	political	backlash.	
The	abeyance	of	s.	33,	they	argue,	gives	judges	the	de	facto	last	word	and	ensures	that	the	courts	remain	su-
preme	over	other	branches	of	government.
122	 David	Dyzenhaus	argues	that	if	one	recognizes	a	judicial	role	for	preserving	constitutional	values,	then	ju-
dicial	review	of	legislative	and	governmental	decisions	is	premised	on	this	role	recognition	and	on	ensuring	
that	decision-making	takes	into	account	the	content	of	those	values.	The	executive	and	the	legislature	face	
the	onus	of	justifying	their	decisions	by	reference	to	these	values	either	within	legislation,	or	within	the	
arguments	they	make	under	s.	1	of	the	Charter.	See	David	Dyzenhaus,	“The	Legitimacy	of	the	Rule	of	Law”	
in	2005 New York University School of Law Colloquium in Legal, Political, and Social Philosophy,	online:	
NYU	<http://www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2005/readings/legallegit2.pdf>;	and	“Constituting	Fundamen-
tal	Values,”	supra	note	71.
123	 Similarly,	the	principle	of	federalism	militates	in	favour	of	provincial	experimentation	with	institutional	de-
sign.	Though	higher	and	lower	courts	are	compelled	to	work	toward	unified	standards,	there	need	not	be	
concordance	between	federal	and	provincial	approaches	to	regulation	and	administration.
124	 See	Peter	Carver,	chapter	14,	for	a	discussion	of	administrative	law	in	relation	to	public	inquiries.
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V.  concluSIon: a deMocratIc rule of law 
In the adMInIStratIVe State?
This	chapter	has	explained	how	the	concept	of	the	rule	of	law	and	its	associated	legal	and	
political	principles	are	 fundamental	 to	understanding	 the	 relationship	between	courts	
and	administrative	bodies.	The	realization	of	the	rule	of	law	within	a	democratic	culture	
can	not	only	legitimate	the	sharing	of	public	power	among	courts,	the	executive,	legisla-
tures,	and	administrative	bodies,	but	also	facilitate	the	creation	of	multiple	routes	for	citi-
zens	(and	non-citizens)	to	secure	accountability	for	the	use	of	public	power.	All	parts	of	and	
persons	in	the	state	participate	in	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	the	rule	of	law.	The	mul-
tiplicity	of	institutional	environments,	however,	means	that	the	rule	of	law	will	require	dif-
ferent	responsibilities	and	restraints	for	different	institutional	actors	and	practices.	Though	
this	makes	administrative	law	a	difficult	field	of	study	and	provides	unending	complications	
for	judicial	review	of	administrative	decision-making,	one	positive	reading	of	such	com-
plexity	suggests	that	this	is	a	necessary	consequence	of	the	interaction	between	the	rule	of	
law	and	democracy.	The	simple	system	suggested	by	both	legal	and	political	theory,	then,	
is	capable	of	infinite	variations	and	complexity	in	the	design	of	institutions	and	their	con-
straints.	These	permutations	must	nevertheless	continue	to	adhere	to	the	substance	and	proce-
dures	of	legality—a	process	in	which	courts	play	an	important	role	through	legal	interpret-
ation	of	abstract	principles	and	oversight	of	administrative	practices.125
How	a	judge	understands	the	rule	of	law,	and	his	or	her	role	in	upholding	it,	will	neces-
sarily	shape	how	he	or	she	approaches	the	review	of	decisions	made	by	an	administrative	
tribunal.	Judicial	temperament	is	not	completely	predictable:	judges	may	conceive	of	them-
selves	as	the	Diceyan	defenders	of	the	rule	of	law	against	the	administrative	state;	or	they	
may	view	themselves	the	Dworkinian	legal	guardians	of	the	constitution,	committed	to	up-
holding	the	rights	conception	of	the	rule	of	law;	or	perhaps	they	may	see	their	role	as	the	
Fullerian	cooperative	partner	who	recognizes	democratic	initiatives,	but	still	maintains	in-
stitutional	fidelity	to	rule-of-law	principles.	Institutional	dialogue	and	deference	as	respect	
stand	as	distinctive	forms	of	the	commitment	to	judicial	restraint	in	Canadian	administra-
tive	 law—a	 restraint	 that	 simultaneously	 attempts	 to	 ensure	 judicial	 accountability	 and	
larger	public	law	accountability.
125	 In	a	new	and	significant	case,	the	Supreme	Court	invoked	rule-of-law	values	and	attributes	to	justify	restructur-
ing	the	standard	of	review.	Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,	2008	SCC	9	illustrates	judicial	efforts	to	introduce	
greater	clarity,	fairness,	consistency,	and	simplicity	into	administrative	law	by	reducing	the	standards	of	review	
from	three	to	two—correctness	and	reasonableness—and	by	rebranding	the	pragmatic	and	functional	approach	
as	a	simpler	“standard	of	review	analysis”	(para.	63).	These	efforts	were	informed	by	a	conception	of	the	rule	
of	 law	 that	 explicitly	acknowledges	 the	 tension	between	 judicial	 review	and	democracy.	According	 to	 the	
Court,	judicial	review	upholds	the	rule	of	law	by	ensuring	that	all	exercises	of	public	authority	are	lawful,	rea-
sonable,	and	fair.	But	judicial	review	also	respects	legislative	supremacy	through	the	proper	approach	to	the	
standard	of	review;	recognizing	effective	limits	on	judicial	discretion	such	as	legislative	intent,	privative	claus-
es,	and	agency	expertise;	and	by	rejecting	a	“court-centric”	conception	of	the	rule	of	law	(paras.	27-33).	On	this	
account,	administrative	agencies	as	constitutional	partners	do	exhibit	rule-of-law	attributes,	have	embraced	
rule-of-law	values,	and	can	facilitate	access	to	justice.	The	Court’s	goal	in	this	judgment	was	to	provide	greater	
guidance	for	reviewing	courts,	counsel,	litigants,	and	decision-makers	in	administrative	law.	The	postscript	in	
chapter	8	and	the	accompanying	website	further	consider	these	recent	developments.
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